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REFORMING PUBLIC INTEREST
TORT LAW TO REDRESS PUBLIC
HEALTH EPIDEMICS*
MICHAEL L. RUSTAD* & THOMAS H. KOENIG**
ABSTRACT

This Article is a new audit of parens patriaepublic health lawsuits in
which government attorneys address grave public health problems not
resolved by either private tort litigation or administrative regulations. Our
argument is that public health lawsuits are justified when the states have a
substantial quasi-sovereign interest in reallocating the cost of medical
monitoring or other means of addressing risks created by products-related
disasters. In tobacco and lead paint cases, the state, as subrogee, employed
parenspatriae litigation in an effort to recoup the cost of treating hundreds
of thousands of smoking and lead poisoning victims. The recent British
Petroleum (BP) oil spill parens patriae actions are attempts to compel the
polluters to pay for the public health costs created by the release of millions
Copyright ( Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig 2011.

* The authors would like to thank Donald Gifford for his comments and criticisms on an earlier
draft of this article. While we have different views on the role of tort law in resolving social
problems, we have great respect for the excellence of his scholarship. Michael Rustad also thanks
University of Maryland Law School Dean Phoebe Haddon for inviting him to speak at Maryland,
where Donald Gifford and I debated some of the themes explored in this article. Suffolk
University Law School student Kip Bodi provided valuable cite checking and editorial assistance.
Editor-in-Chief Marc Nardone spent long hours personally working with us through many
iterations of this article.
** Professor Rustad is the Thomas F. Lambert Jr. Professor of Law, which was the first endowed
chair at Suffolk University Law School. He is the Co-Director of Suffolk's nationally ranked
Intellectual Property Law Concentration and is the 2011 chair of the American Association of
Law Schools Torts & Compensation Systems Section. Professor Rustad has more than 1,000
citations on Westlaw. His most recent book is SOFTWARE LICENSING: PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICAL STRATEGIES (Oxford University Press, 2011).
*** Thomas Koenig is a Professor of Sociology & Anthropology at Northeastern University
where he helped to found the Law Policy & Society Ph.D program as well as its Doctorate in Law
& Policy. He was a Liberal Arts Fellow at Harvard University Law School and a Fulbright
Scholar at the University of Belgrade in Serbia. Along with Michael Rustad, he has testified
before both Houses of Congress. Their numerous joint publications have been cited in The
Economist, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, Time, U.S. News and World Report, as
well as leading legal periodicals such as the NationalLaw Journal and the American Lawyer.

331

332

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 14:331

of gallons of oil and toxic chemicals into the waters of the Gulf of Mexico.
These Gulf State parens patriae actions raise complex issues of
justiciability, standing, separation of powers, and regulation by litigation.
The size of the populations affected, the magnitude of the harm inflicted,
and the inability of traditional tort principles to offer the victims any relief
are important factors in determining the legitimacy of these public health
actions. Part I traces the trajectory of public health law tort litigation from
its roots in medieval English equity doctrine to the recent actions by U.S.
state governments and municipalities in the aftermath of the BP oil spill.
Part II summarizes and critically examines Professor Donald Gifford's
thesis that the public law model of tort law employing parens patriae
actions are a form of "faux legislation" that usurps the legitimate functions
of America's legislative branch. Gifford argues that parenspatriaelawsuits
to resolve public health problems are doomed to be ineffective and, worse
yet, raise the specter of creating an unaccountable "fourth branch of
government." Part III presents a brief defense of the public law model of
tort law as a mechanism to allocate the costs of health and environmental
catastrophes from the corporate defendant to the state. Parens patriae
litigation is beneficial because it redresses not just one on one or
particularized injuries but also vindicates societal interests.
INTRODUCTION

The sinking of British Petroleum's oil rig created the "largest marine
oil spill in history with an approximate release of 4.9 million barrels of oil,
methane gas and other pollutants."' The BP oil spill has led to what are
potentially the largest public health parenspatriaelawsuits in world history
because of the short and long-term impacts of oil and dispersants in the
states affected by the spill and cleanup. In the wake of the April 2010 BP
oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, attorneys general (AGs) in Alabama and
Mississippi filed nuisance and Oil Pollution Act claims against several
major oil industry defendants, charging them with responsibility for
2
massive environmental, public health, and economic devastation.
1. Complaint, Alabama ex rel. King v. Transocean, Ltd., No. 2:20 10cy00691 at 2 (M.D. Ala.
Aug. 12, 2010) (describing magnitude of the BP oil spill and its public health as well as
environmental dimensions). The BP oil spill may have been surpassed when "[b]etween five and
10 million barrels of oil poured into the Persian Gulf in 1991 when Iraqi troops, retreating from
their occupation of Kuwait, set fire to desert oil wells and opened the valves on oil rigs and
pipelines. The spill . . . devastated marine wildlife and coastal habitats in Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia." Mark Tutton, Lessons Learned from the Largest Oil Spill in History, CNN WORLD (June
4, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-04/world/kuwait.oil.spillIslicks-oil-spill-rigs-andpipelines? s=PM:WORLD.
2. Alabama's AG filed one public environmental tort complaint against BP and its corporate
affiliates connected to the oil spill. Complaint, Alabama ex rel. King v. BP, P.L.C., No.
2:2010cv00690 (M. supra D. Ala. Aug. 12, 2010) [hereinafter BP Complaint]. That same day, the
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Louisiana's BP oil industry complaint explicitly addressed the public health
implications of the disaster, asserting parens patriae3 authority to protect
"the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of' that state. 4 These Gulf
Coast parens patriae actions represent the states' societal interest that is
independent from the economic losses suffered by local fishermen,
shrimpers, oystermen, hotel owners and other individual plaintiffs. In its
public nuisance complaint,5 Louisiana's Attorney General 6 placed
particular emphasis on the public health implications of the spill, stating
"[t]he presence of oil, gas and other pollutants in Louisiana coastal waters
continues to this day, and has caused severe damage to the environment,
endangering human life and health, and is likely to continue to do so for an
unspecified period of time, in violation of Louisiana law." 7 A Louisiana law
firm hired a toxicologist who challenges "government assurances that Gulf
Coast seafood is safe to eat in the wake of the BP oil spill, saying it poses 'a
significant danger to public health."' 8 A scientist from the National
Resources Defense Council echoes these concerns. 9
Alabama AG also filed a virtually identical complaint against non-BP companies such as
Transocean Ltd., the provider of drilling management services and designer of the oil rig, and
Halliburton Energy Services, who completed the cementing operations. Complaint, supra note 1.
3. Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. P.R.,458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982) ("Parenspatriaemeans literally
parent of the country.' The parens patriae action has its roots in the common-law concept of the
'royal prerogative.' The royal prerogative included the right or responsibility to take care of
persons who 'are legally unable, on account of mental incapacity, whether it proceed from (1).
nonage: (2). idiocy: or (3). lunacy: to take proper care of themselves and their property."'). The
parens patriae institution evolved to address other matters of "grave public concern" such as
conspiracies to fix freight rates, water pollution, or the diversion of water or other natural
resources. Id. at 605.
4. Complaint, Louisiana v. B.P. Exploration & Production, Inc., No. 2:1 1-cv-00516 (E.D.
La., Mar. 3, 2011) (stating that Louisiana sued "on its own behalf to protect the State's economic
and environmental resources and revenue, and as parens patriae on behalf of the citizens of
Louisiana who have been, and will continue to be, impacted by the Gulf Oil Spill").
5. A public nuisance is a tort that enables the States or other governmental agencies to abate
a condition dangerous to the public health or environment. "It consists of conduct or omissions
which offend, interfere with, or cause damage to the public in the exercise of rights common to all
in a manner such as to offend public morals, interfere with use by the public of a public place or
endanger or injure the property, health, safety, or comfort of a considerable number of persons."
Copart Indus. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 362 N.E.2d 968, 971 (N.Y. 1977).
6. Louisiana has a long history of deploying parens patriae in public health matters. In
Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900), Louisiana filed a complaint against Texas, its Governor,
and its Health Officer over its misuse of their powers of "quarantines over infectious or contagious
diseases" after a yellow fever epidemic in 1897. Louisiana contended that Texas exercised its
quarantine powers as a pretext for diverting commerce from New Orleans to Galveston. Id at 20.
7. Complaint, supra note 4, at 32.
8. Kari Huus, Panel Challenges Gulf Seafood Safety All-Clear, MSNBC.COM (December
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40494122/ns/us-news-environment/t/panel2010),
27,
challenges-gulf-seafood-safety-all-clear/.
9. The Switchboard Blog, BP Oil Disaster at One Year: Assessing the Public Health
Threats, MNN.COM (April 19, 2011), http://www.mnn.com/health/fitness-well-being/stories/bp-
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The dimensions of the public health problem produced by the oil spill
are presently unknown and unknowable because, as the Center for Disease
Control acknowledges in a recent report:
The specific chemicals and concentrations will vary
depending on the location of the oil, length of time since
the oil was released into the environment, type and stage of
response, materials used during spill remediation, climate
conditions, use of personal protective equipment (PPE),
and the workers' specific tasks. 10
Much of the public health impact of the spill may not materialize for a
considerable period because toxic exposures often produce latent injuries.I1
In March of 2011, the National Institutes of Health initiated a "national
study to track possible health effects of the BP Deepwater Horizon spill on
the 55,000 clean-up workers and volunteers in Louisiana, Florida,
Mississippi, and Alabama." 1 2 The National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health continues to monitor the long-term health impact of the
BP oil spill, reporting that as of December 2010:
Overall, response workers in the exposed group reported
higher prevalences of all types of symptoms than workers
in the unexposed group. Those reporting exposure to oil
and those reporting exposure to dispersants had
significantly higher prevalences of upper respiratory
oil-disaster-at-one-year-assessing-public-health-threats ("Contaminants in oil, such as
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) and metals, can accumulate in the food chain
contaminating seafood and leading to health risks, particularly for people who eat a lot of seafood.
The large volume of oil that spewed into this productive fishery, the use of subsurface dispersant
chemicals to breakdown the oil into smaller particles, and the findings of plumes of oil-spill
related contaminants in the subsurface raise questions about the extent and duration of potential
seafood contamination. A long-term monitoring program is needed.").
10. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH, NIOSH INTERIM INFORMATION, DEEPWATER HORIZON RESPONSE: CHEMICAL
EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT CONSIDERATIONS FOR USE IN EVALUATING DEEPWATER HORIZON
at
available
2,
2010),
(July
VOLUNTEERS
AND
WORKERS
RESPONSE

http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/oilspillresponse/assessment.html.
I1. Kari Huus, supra note 8 (citing what the law firm calls a state-of-the-art laboratory
analysis, toxicologists, chemists and marine biologists, retained by the firm of environmental
attorney Stuart Smith, who contend that the government's seafood testing program, which has
focused on ensuring the seafood was free of the cancer-causing components of crude oil, has
overlooked other harmful elements).
12. Press Release, United States Representative Lois Capps (D-CA), Capps Applauds Launch
ofFederal Government Study to Track Health Effects of BP's Gulf Oil Spill on Clean-Up Workers
(Mar. 1, 2011) available at http://www.house.gov/list/press/ca23_capps/pr030408gaviota.html ("I

commend the Obama Administration for taking this proactive step to monitor the health of the
thousands of oil spill clean-up workers and Gulf Coast residents who were exposed to the BP Oil
spill. As a public health nurse and witness to the 1969 oil spill in Santa Barbara, I know the
damage wrought by BP will inevitably affect the public's health. But when the BP oil spill hit,
scientific research on how exposure would affect worker health was lacking.").
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symptoms, cough, and lower respiratory symptoms than
those without these exposures.

. .

. Dispersants used in the

response and any remaining volatiles in the oil may cause
respiratory symptoms and could be responsible in part for
the symptoms reported.13
BP oil spill clean-up workers reported physical and mental health
problems, including "fatigue, upset stomach or vomiting, dizziness, heavy
sweating, thirst, headaches, vision problems, jaw clenching, nonspecific
aches and pains or disturbed sleep" as well as numerous psychological
problems.14 Columbia University's School of Public Health surveyed Gulf
Coast residents and concluded that there was:
a significant and potentially lasting impact of the disaster
on the health, mental health, and economic fortunes of Gulf
residents and their children. As demonstrated by the study,
done after the well was capped, there is a significant and
persistent public health crisis in this region underscored by
the large number of children with medical and
psychological problems related to the oil disaster. 15
The BP oil spill disaster provides an emblematic example of the complex
nature of collective injuries that may (or may not) ripen into a full-blown
public health crisis for the Gulf Coast States.
Ironically, only a few months before Louisiana and Alabama's public
health-based complaints against BP and the other oil defendants, Professor
Donald Gifford of the University of Maryland Law School, the foremost
expert on parens patriae litigation,16 published Suing the Tobacco and
13. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH, NIOSH INTERIM INFORMATION, SUMMARY OF INTERIM REPORT #9, HEALTH HAZARD
EVALUATION
OF
DEEPWATER
HORIZON
RESPONSE
WORKERS,
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/oilspillresponse/pdfs/summaryIntrpt_9.pdf (last visited June
27, 2011) (summarizing December 7, 2010 update of report of health study of 826 BP oil spill
response workers).
14. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH, NIOSH INTERIM INFORMATION, MANAGING TRAUMATIC INCIDENT STRESS FOR
DEEPWATER
HORIZON
RESPONSE
AND
VOLUNTEER
WORKERS,
available at
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/oilspillresponse/traumatic.html (last visited June 27, 2011).
15. Children's Health Fund Responds to Public Health Crisis by Providing Mobile Clinic to
Care for Children Impacted by the BP Oil Spill, PR NEWSWIRE (Oct. 7, 2010),
http://www.pmewswire.com/news-releases/childrens-health-fund-responds-to-public-healthcrisis-by-providing-mobile-clinic-to-care-for-children-impacted-by-the-bp-oil-spill104480569.html. See also Fund Targets Spill-Related Mental Illness, UNITED PRESS
INTERNATIONAL (August 16, 2010), http://www.upi.com/TopNews/US/2010/08/16/Fundtargets-spill-related-mental-illness/UPI-17251282007088/ ("BP said it will provide S52 million
for mental health services on the U.S. Gulf Coast, where experts say the oil spill has caused
widespread mental illness.").
16. Donald Gifford, formerly the Dean of the University of Maryland School of Law, is
currently the Edward M. Robertson Research Professor of Law at Maryland. He publishes widely
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Lead Pigment Industries: Government Litigation as Public Health
Prescription.17 This study of parenspatriae public health litigation builds
upon Gifford's path-breaking law review articles, 18 which criticize state
attorneys general who partnered with trial lawyers as special counsel in the
government public health cases against Big Tobacco and the lead pigment
paint manufacturers. Gifford describes public health parenspatriae lawsuits
as "dead in the water," at least in mass products liability cases, because of
the courts' unwillingness to accept this legal remedy.19 Gifford cautions
that public health lawsuits bypass legislatures entirely, creating the peril of
parens patriae lawsuits devolving into a "de facto fourth branch of
government." 20
In this Article, we argue that Gifford's public health torts obituary, like
the incorrect reports of Mark Twain's demise, is premature. 2 1 Louisiana's
March 2011 complaint has resurrected the equitable doctrine of parens
patriaeto rectify the long-term health consequences created by the massive
British Petroleum oil spill. The publication of Gifford's critical analysis of
the fifty-year history of public health torts is extremely timely. As the Gulf
Coast states consider their options in the aftermath of the BP environmental
calamity, they now have a bible of the limitations of parenspatriae actions
in prior products-related public health lawsuits.
Professor Gifford's cautionary account of overreaching by
governmental lawyers will be invaluable to policymakers and courts that
will be considering the legal implications of the BP oil spill's parens
patriae actions. The high water mark for product-related parens patriae
in the fields of tort law, products liability, and complex litigation. Foundation Press recently
issued the Fifth Edition of Cases and Materials on the Law of Torts edited by Gifford and his
colleague Oscar Gray, who is the 2010 Prosser Award recipient by the Association of American
Law Schools' Section on Torts & Compensation Systems.
17. DONALD G. GIFFORD, SUING THE TOBACCO AND LEAD PIGMENT INDUSTRIES:
GOVERNMENT LITIGATION AS PUBLIC HEALTH PRESCRIPTION (2010).
18. The themes in Gifford's book were prefigured in two prior law review articles. See
Donald G. Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature: State Attorneys General and Parens Patriae
Product Litigation, 49 B.C. L. REV. 913, 921 (2008) [hereinafter Gifford, Impersonating the

Legislature] (criticizing states that have delegated "public policy decisions regarding which public
health and safety crisis to address and who should be held financially accountable for these
matters" to trial attorneys specializing in mass products litigation); see also Donald G. Gifford,
Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 753-54 (2003)
[hereinafter Gifford, Public Nuisance] (discussing the advent of public nuisance as a mass

products tort and detailing the role of government lawyers in tobacco litigation).
19. GIFFORD, supra note 17, at 228 (concluding that products-related public health parens
patriaeactions are "dead in the water").
20. GIFFORD, supra note 17, at 134.
21. "Stories abound of obituaries accidentally published whilst the person concerned was still
alive. One of the best known examples was Mark Twain, who responded 'The rumors of my death
have been greatly exaggerated."' FACT INDEX, http://www.fact-index.com/o/ob/obituary.html
(last visited April 24, 2011).
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was a 2000 case in which Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Ukraine asserted
parens patriae standing to seek reimbursement for smoking-related health
care costs. 22 The refusal of U.S. courts to grant standing to foreign
countries to pursue products-related cases suggests a judicial reluctance to
expand parens patriae to address transborder public health disasters. The
judicial hesitation about expansionary parens patriae is reflected in one
court's comparison of public nuisance law in parens patriae actions to a
tort monster "that would devour in one gulp the entire law of tort." 23
This article presents a new audit of the public law model for resolving
health or environmental problems in the absence of effective leadership by
regulators or legislatures. 24 Part I briefly introduces the equitable history of
parens patriae and its modem applications to public health and
environmental disasters. Part II critically examines Professor Gifford's
thesis that the public law model of tort law and parens patriaeactions are
not only ineffective but also threaten America's constitutional separation of
powers. Gifford's thesis is that public/private partnerships between
government attorneys and trial lawyers fail "to accomplish their public
health objectives," and undermine democracy. 2 5 Part III is a brief rebuttal to
Gifford, defending the public law model of public health torts. 2 6 Public
health parenspatriae litigation is an important legal mechanism to address
toxic torts and other products-related calamities. In the contemporary era of
hazardous technologies and cross-border industrial entities, potent societal
remedies are necessary to defend the public's health and well-being.

22. Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 229 F.3d 332 (1st Cir. 2000) (ruling that these
countries had no ability to file a parens patriae action as Mexico produced no evidence that a
branch of the U.S. government granted them standing).
23. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 505 (N.J. 2007) (ruling that the plaintiffs in a lead
paint case could not proceed in public nuisance since they did not meet the special injury
requirement that is a predicate for this tort).
24. We use the term public law model of torts to describe these parens patriae actions to
redress public health and environmental problems. In Don Gifford's most recent article, he
extends his critique of the public law model to parens patriae actions filed to address problems
such as climate change and mass products catastrophes. Donald G. Gifford, Climate Change and
the Public Law Model of Torts: Reinvigorating Judicial Restraint Doctrines, 62 S.C. L. REV. 201,

204 (2011).
25. GIFFORD, supra note 17, at 218.

26. The public law model of torts is frequently under attack by tort reformers. See John T.
Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, Comment, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of Tort

Retrenchment, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1038-39 (2005) ("As the society has become
increasingly complex, and the harms a single producer or segment of the economy could create
ever more dramatic, the challenges for a civil justice system justified by an ideology of
individualistic dispute-resolution have been profound.").
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I. THE HISTORY OF PROTECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH THROUGH PARENS
PA TRIAE ACTIONS

At common law, social interests were largely secured by a
doctrine that the king was parens patriae, father of his
country. That is, he was the guardian of public and social
interests of all kinds and hence his courts of law and of
equity had a general superintendence of all matters where
public rights (i.e. social interests or public interests) might
be jeopardized. 27
A. The Roots ofParens Patriae in Equity
Parenspatriae is a Latin phrase that is roughly translated as "parent of
the country," a doctrine that originated in Thirteenth Century England.
Under this medieval equitably-based remedy, the King asserted his inherent
"right to guard and enforce all charities of a public nature by virtue of his
general superintending power over the public interests." 2 8 Parens patriae
empowered the Crown to safeguard the interests of the insane, the poor,
29
infants, the elderly and others who were unable to protect themselves.
Parenspatriaepowers were deployed to protect the rights of subjects "who
lacked a legally cognizable injury." 30 The powers of the Crown included
the "supervision or control over local government, education, public health,
pauperism, housing, and a wide variety of other social and industrial
matters." 3 1
The trust doctrine of cy pres evolved in equity to ensure that the King
would carry out the purpose of a charitable bequest in situations where there

27. ROSCOE POUND, 3 JURISPRUDENCE 264 (1959).
28. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS IN ENGLAND AMERICA

477, 521 (1886) (citing Blackstone's Commentaries and other authorities).
29. Parens patriae was originated as an equitable doctrine justifying the King's power to take
over the affairs of "persons unable to manage their affairs. In England, at Common Law, the King

as parens patriae is the guardian of all idiots and lunatics, which function he exercises through
some court." CHARLES PHINEAS SHERMAN, ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD (photo.
Reprint 1993) (1917); see also Note, Federal Jurisdiction: State Parens Patriae Standing in Suits
Against Federal Agencies, 61 MINN. L. REV. 691, 691 (1977); THEODORE W. DWIGHT,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PERSONS AND PERSONAL PROPERTY 305 (Edward F. Dwight ed.
1894).
30. See, e.g., Sara Zdeb, Note, From Georgia v. Tennessee Copper to Massachusetts v. EPA:
Parens Patriae Standing for State Global-Warming Plaintifs, 96 GEO. L. J. 1059, 1062-63
(2008) (discussing roots of parens patriae in the English law of equity); see also Robert A.
Winstock, Note, The Lorax State: Parens Patriae and the Provision of Public Goods, 109
COLUM. L. REv. 798 (2009) (recounting the history of the quasi-sovereign interest reflected in
U.S. state actions based upon parens patriae actions).
31. FREDERIC AUSTIN OGG, GOVERNMENTS OF EUROPE 70-71 (1922) (describing the powers
of the Crown as including parenspatriae actions in support of public health and welfare).
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was no other trustee to administer the trust. Parens patriae empowered
England's sovereign to act as a fiduciary for intestates. Blackstone's
Commentaries described the King's authority to "seize upon his [the
intestate's] goods as the parens patriae and general trustee of the
kingdom." 32 The Lord Chancellor of the Court of Chancery was delegated
the power to pursue equity as the King's representative, making the Lord
Chancellor

"for

all

public purposes . ..

the keeper

of the King's

conscience."33 As early as the Fourteenth Century, English law expanded
parenspatriae by employing public nuisance to abate nuisances injurious to
the general public. 34
B. Parens Patriae Comes to America

The American Colonies imported the equitable powers of parens
patriae to protect individuals who lacked the capacity to protect
themselves. 35 In the U.S., "[t]he State alone, as parens patriae," was
charged with caring for the insane, the infirm, vulnerable children, and
other defenseless individuals. 36 After the American Revolution, the states
extended their parens patriae powers to cover "disputes between the
interests of separate states with regard to natural resources and territory." 37
The states acted on their inherent authority to protect quasi-sovereign
public interests and the welfare of their citizenry. 38

32. Charles Gross, The Medieval Law of Intestacy, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW

723 (1909) (noting that
Blackstone, in turn, relied upon the opinion of Sir Edward Coke, the eminent Seventeenth Century
English jurist and Member of Parliament).
33. JOSEPH STORY, supra note 28, at 521 (explaining the equitable roots ofparens patriae).
34. William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 998 (1966)
(tracing the history of the ancient tort of public nuisance from the Thirteenth Century English
reign of Edward III to the middle of the Twentieth Century).
35. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW CENTER, WILLIAM MITCHELL COLLEGE OF LAW, Children &
Families, http://publichealthlawcenter.org/topics/tobacco-control/smoking-regulation/familieschildren (last visited April 9, 2011) ("The doctrine of parens patriae (literally, 'father of the
people') refers to the power of the state to usurp the rights of a natural parent and act as the parent
of any child who is in need of protection. . . . In most jurisdictions, parenspatriae is reflected in
the principle that the single most important concern of the courts is the protection of the 'best
interests' of children.").
36. CLARENCE ALEXANDER, LAW OF ARREST IN CRIMINAL AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS 2039
(1949).
SCHOOLS, ED. SELECTED ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY

37. Gifford, Impersonatingthe Legislature,supra note 18, at 936.
38. Alexander Lemann, Note, Sheep in Wolves' Clothing: Removing Parens Patriae Suits
Under the Class Action FairnessAct, Ill COLUM. L. REV. 121, 122 (2011) (recounting history of
equitable doctrine from "the 'royal prerogative' granted to the King of England to sue on behalf of

'helpless subjects"' to its expansion in Twentieth Century America to state actions brought "to
vindicate the rights of their constituents").
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The U.S. Supreme Court can adjudicate interstate disputes under its
"original jurisdiction" authority granted by Article III of the Constitution. 39
Parens patriae was employed as a means for states to abate inter-state
pollution and resolve disputes over the allocation of natural resources. 40 For
example, Justice Holmes' opinion in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. 41
upheld Georgia's parens patriae standing to protect its citizens against a
copper smelter that discharged "noxious gases from the defendant's plant in
Tennessee.'"42 The Tennessee Copper Court expressly stated that the state
had a sovereign right to enjoin environmental pollution that "threaten[s]
damage on so considerable a scale . .. to health."43

In an 1883 case, Baltimore & Potomac Railroad Co. v. Fifth Baptist
Church,4 4 the Court held that the operation of a railroad yard was a
nuisance due in part to "the smoke from the chimneys, with its cinders,
dust, and offensive odors." 45 The Court rejected the defendant's argument
that its compliance with smoke stack permitting regulations shielded the
firm from liability. 4 6 The Court observed that the railroad could be required
to remodel its facility or to relocate to a less disruptive setting to remediate
the nuisance.4 7
In Missouri v. Illinois,4 8 the U.S. Supreme Court considered a
Missouri parens patriae action, charging Illinois with endangering the
health of Missourians by dumping Chicago sewage into the Mississippi
river basin. The Court noted that the nuisance law of an earlier era needed
to evolve to better accommodate cross-border environmental hazards. 4 9
However, the Court ultimately rejected Missouri's claim, finding an
inadequate causal connection between water pollution originating in
Chicago and a resultant typhoid fever epidemic in St. Louis. 50
39. Joseph Zimmerman,

INTERSTATE DISPUTES: THE SUPREME COURT'S ORIGINAL

JURISDICTION (2006) (reviewing the history of interstate conflicts adjudicated by the U.S.
Supreme Court including disputes over state boundaries, natural resource allocation, unclaimed
property, taxation, pollution and other issues).
40. See, e.g., New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921) (dismissing New York's bill for
an injunction if New Jersey's operation of a sewer proved to be injurious to the health, welfare, or
commerce of the people of New York).
41. 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (holding that the state of Georgia had a sufficient quasi-sovereign
interest to seek relief against the discharge of sulphurous fumes from Tennessee copper smelters).
42. Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. P.R., 458 U.S. 592, 604 (1982) (discussing Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238 (1907)).
43. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238 (1907).
44. 108 U.S. 317 (1883).
45. Id. at 329.
46. Id. at 334-35.
47. Id. at 334.
48. 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
49. Id. at 522.
50. Id. at 526.
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Advances in the science of public health enabled parens patriae
lawsuits to settle disputes created by cross-border environmental pollution
more effectively. 5 1 By the first decades of the Twentieth Century, as public
health science evolved, municipalities had better scientific information on
what public health risks warranted quarantines or other governmental action
to abate dangerous conditions. 52 By the end of the Second World War, the
use of the parens patriae action to defend governmental interests in
protecting their citizens from environmental and public health crises was
well established. 5 3
In the post-World War II period, states deployed their parens patriae
powers to resolve antitrust and unfair competition claims between states. In
Georgia v. PennsylvaniaR.R. Co.,54 for example, the State of Georgia filed
a parens patriae lawsuit against some twenty railroads that "conspired to
fix rates so as to discriminate against Georgia" in violation of the federal
antitrust laws. 55 Georgia's case against the common carriers was that their
activities created "blight." 5 6 The Court characterized the parenspatriaeas a
mechanism through which the state could address "matters of grave public
concern [where they had] an interest apart from the particular individuals
who may be affected." 57 In a 1982 decision, the Court further stretched
parens patriae to address an employment discrimination claim filed by
Puerto Rico on behalf of its workers against apple growers whose policies
favored workers from Jamaica. 5 8 The common element in these modem
parenspatriae actions is a quasi-sovereign interest not addressed by either
legislation or traditional litigation.
C. Public Nuisance & the Abatement ofEnvironmental Pollution
From the medieval period to Blackstone's day, torts
protected the public's health. A neighbor who 'infected the
51. See, e.g., id. at 522 (observing that the advance of science made it possible to bring
lawsuit that would have failed a half century before).
52. Municipalities have a legitimate right to abate conditions dangerous to the public health
under their police powers. See, e.g., City of Jacksonville v. Sohn, 616 So.2d 1173, 1174 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1993); see also JTR Colebrook, Inc. v. Town of Colebrook, 829 A.2d 1089 (N.H.
2003) ("whatever power towns may have to regulate to protect the public health under [the statute]
is subordinate to the State law").
53. See, e.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945) ("Suits by a State,
parenspatriae, have been long recognized.").
54. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
55. Id. at 445.
56. Id. at 450.
57. Id. at 451.
58. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. P.R., 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982) (discussing parenspatriae
lawsuit filed in Puerto Rico against fifty-one Virginia apple growers who allegedly discriminated
against Puerto Rican temporary workers by hiring Jamaican workers).
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air' or polluted the environment was liable for the offense
of nuisance at common law. Nuisances are difficult to
conceptualize because the offensive nature of the harm is
based on subjective sensory reactions to unpleasant sounds,
sights and smells. Courts calculated damages for nuisance
torts based on the depreciation in the value of land and the
degree of personal discomfort and annoyance. 59
From the early common law onwards, parens patriaeactions enjoined
public health dangers through public nuisance tort actions. Public nuisance
is an elastic tort that has the inbuilt capacity to stretch to address public
health predicaments. 60 This equitably-based tort action is used to enjoin
"conduct or omissions which offend, interfere with, or cause damage to the
public in the exercise of rights common to all in a manner .. . that
endangers or injures the property health, safety or comfort of a considerable
number of persons." 6 1 Courts of equity issued injunctive relief against
conditions affecting public health such as "bad odors, smoke, dust, and
vibration.' 62 Vermin-infested grounds, unhealthy multiple dwelling and
63
other public health problems also led to actions for public nuisance.
William Prosser conceptualized public nuisances as a flexible
instrumentality for social control and "a species of catch-all [for] low grade
criminal offense." 64 The Reporters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
agreed in their recapitulation of the law of public nuisance:
Thus public nuisances included interference with the public
health, as in the case of keeping diseased animals or the
59. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American Civil
Justice System as a Battlegroundof Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (2002) (tracing

the historical struggle over the parameters of U.S. tort law).
60. The elements of public nuisance are the virtually the same in all jurisdictions. David A.
Grossman, Warming Up to Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2003) ("The basic elements of a public nuisance claim are quite uniform

throughout the country, since most states follow the approach embodied in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. To be liable for a public nuisance, defendants must carry on, or participate to a
substantial extent in carrying on, activities that create ' an unreasonable interference with a right
common to the general public . .. The first critical element of the definition of public nuisance is
"a right common to the general public. Such a right is collective, not like the right each individual
has not to be assaulted. Thus, if stream pollution deprives 100 landowners of the use of the water
for purposes connected with their land, that alone would not constitute a public nuisance. If,
however, pollution prevents the use of a public beach or kills the fish in a navigable stream and
thus potentially affects all members of the community, it impinges on a public right and can be
characterized as a public nuisance. The enjoyment of the natural environment would seem to
constitute such a public right.").
61. Copart Indus. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 362 N.E.2d 968 (N.Y. 1977).
62. Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity; and Speech, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 21, 42 (1997).
63. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 646 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed.
1984).
64. William L. Prosser, PrivateAction for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 999 (1966).
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maintenance of a pond breeding malarial mosquitoes; with
the public safety, as in the case of the storage of explosives
in the midst of a city or the shooting of fireworks in the
public streets; with the public morals, as in the case of
houses of prostitution or indecent exhibitions; with the
public peace, as by loud and disturbing noises; with the
public comfort, as in the case of widely disseminated bad
odors, dust and smoke; with the public convenience, as by
the obstruction of a public highway or a navigable stream;
and with a wide variety of other miscellaneous public rights
of a similar kind. 6 5
In general, public authorities, rather than individuals, file injunctive
actions for public nuisances in contrast to private nuisances, which are filed
by non-governmental plaintiffs. 6 6 Private individuals lack standing to sue
for public nuisance unless they can demonstrate "special damages" from the
public nuisance that are separate from the injury to the public. 67 In the
words of the Reporters for the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
Conduct does not become a public nuisance merely because
it interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by a large
number of persons. There must be some interference with a
public right. A public right is one common to all members
of the general public. It is collective in nature and not like
the individual right that everyone has not to be assaulted or
defamed or defrauded or negligently injured. Thus the
pollution of a stream that merely deprives fifty or a hundred
lower riparian owners of the use of the water for purposes
connected with their land does not for that reason alone
become a public nuisance. If, however, the pollution
prevents the use of a public bathing beach or kills the fish
in a navigable stream and so deprives all members of the
community of the right to fish, it becomes a public
nuisance.68
Recently, North Carolina filed a public nuisance action against the
Tennessee Valley Authority for emitting excessive sulfur dioxide and
nitrogen oxide, to the detriment of the citizens in that state. 69 Cross-border

65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §821 B, cmt. b.
66. Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 451 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1983).
67. Queens County Bus. Alliance v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n., 98 A.D.2d 743, 744 (N.Y. App. Div.

1983).
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §851B, cmt. g (explaining the standing requirement
that injury be collective as opposed to a particularized injury to individuals).
69. N.C., ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010).
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parens patriae litigation is expected to evolve further because of "[t]he
nature of global business operations and the transport of toxic substance
augurs for an increasing number of public health epidemics created in the
Twenty-First Century." 70 The widespread contamination from the posttsunami nuclear reactors in Japan and from the Chernobyl radioactivity
disaster reminds us that toxic torts do not respect national borders and that
illness may not manifest itself for decades to come. 7 1
D. Public Health Parens Patriae Actions
The states have long employed their "police powers" to "control
venereal diseases and other contagious diseases . . . considered to be an

'unsocial status' which is dangerous to our members of our society, and
subject to supervision under the Police Power." 7 2 Governments may
override religious and other objections to vaccinations in order to protect
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare of their citizens. In
Jacobson v. Massachusetts,7 3 for example, the Court upheld the police
power of the state to require a citizen to submit to vaccination in order to
shield the public from epidemics. 74

70. THOMAS C. GALLIGAN ET AL., TORT LAW CASES, PERSPECTIVES, AND PROBLEMS 630

(2007).
71. See, e.g., PHYSICIANS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, Japan Nuclear Reactor Crisis

(March 14, 2011), available at http://www.psr.org/take-action/safe-energy/japan-nuclearreactor-crisis.html.
72. ALEXANDER, supra note 36, at 2045; see also In re Guardianship of Thompson, 502

N.E.2d 916, 921 n.2 (1986) ("The State may invoke its police power, plenary in nature, as a means
to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare. Unlike the police power, the State
parens patriaepower, literally meaning 'parent of the country,' is a limited power of the State to
act as guardians to persons with legal disabilities, such as infants and mental incompetents who
lack the capacity to protect their own best interests. The modem concept of parens patriae is
subject to three limitations. First, exercise of parens patriaepower is presumed to apply only to
those "dependent" children who lack the mental competence of adults. Second, before the State
acts in its capacity as parens patriae,the federal due process clause requires the State to
demonstrate that, by clear and convincing evidence, exercise of its power is necessary because the
child's parent or custodian is unfit. Third and finally, State exercise of this power must attempt to
further the best interests of the child.").
73. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
74. Id. at 30 (ruling that local authorities in Cambridge, Massachusetts could require
compulsory vaccinations as part of their police powers in advancing the public health and
welfare). In Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938 (E.D. Ark. 2002), the court upheld the
constitutionality of an immunization statute for school children. The court reasoned that the
compulsory immunization law was neutral and therefore heightened scrutiny was not required
even though the statute burdened the plaintiffs' right to free exercise. Id. at 953. The court
observed that "[i]t is well established that the State may enact reasonable regulations to protect
the public health and the public safety, and it cannot be questioned that compulsory immunization
is a permissible exercise of the State's police power." Id. at 954.
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In 1922, Justice Louis Brandeis authored Zucht v. King,7 5 a decision
that upheld compulsory vaccination as a public health necessity. 76 The
Zucht Court ruled that a decision of public officials to exclude a child from
a San Antonio, Texas school when she refused to submit to vaccination did
not violate her right to due process. 77 In Town of Mount Pleasant v. Van
Tassell,78 a New York trial court enjoined the operation of a piggery that
drew rats, flies and threatened the public health through its unsanitary
conditions. The trial court ruled that the piggery was a public nuisance
despite local zoning that permitted farm animals. 79
The states are not likely to succeed in their public nuisance litigation
against public health threats if they are unable to demonstrate a collective
injury beyond harm to individuals. Baltzeger v. CarolinaMidland Ry. Co. 80
was an emblematic case in which the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled
that public nuisance was not cognizable because the plaintiff could not
demonstrate a special injury. In Baltzeger, the plaintiff contended that the
railroad line's obstruction of the flow of surface water created foul odors
and spread diseases that afflicted his family. 8 1 The South Carolina Supreme
Court ruled that a condition that affected the plaintiff and his family, but not
other inhabitants, was not classifiable as a public nuisance. 82
75. 260 U.S. 174 (1922) (affirming a trial court's judgment dismissing a student's complaint
that public and private school officials denied her the right to attend school due to her refusal to be
vaccinated).
76. CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, OUR Two CENTURIES OF LAW AND LIFE: 1775-1975: THE
WORK OF SUPREME COURT AND THE IMPACT OF BOTH CONGRESS AND PRESIDENTS 121 (2001)
(quoting Justice Brandeis as stating that public officials "have broad discretion in drafting and
enforcing public health laws").
77. 260 U.S. 174 at 176.
78. 166 N.Y.S.2d 458 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957).
79. Id. at 462.
80. 32 S.E. 358 (S.C. 1899).
81. Id. at 359 (noting that the plaintiff's complaint stated that in 1886 or 1887 "the Blackville,
Alston and Newberry Railroad Company ... constructed the line of railway . .. caus[ing] a high
embankment to be created, and also dug deep ditches on the upper and lower sides of said
embankment, which ... stopped the flow and passage of the surface water down said hollow, ....
and in times of rains and floods caused the said water to accumulate in a pond on the upper side of
said railway track, and also caused a considerable quantity of water to accumulate and gather in
the said ditch on the lower side of said railroad track; and the said water, so collected, remains in
said ditches." Id. at 358. The plaintiff contended that the foul water emitted "nauseous odors and
gases, which poison and pollute the air in and around the plaintiffs said dwelling house, and
renders the same unhealthy and dangerous to live at, and has within the last three years caused
annoyance, sickness, pains and suffering to the plaintiff, and also to the members of his family,
and has within that period caused the death of one of plaintiffs children, who was made sick by
the offensive and nauseous gases emitted from said stagnant waters").
82. Id. at 360 ("The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs lot, upon which is his dwelling, is in
the corporate limits of the town of Wagener, and within one hundred feet of defendant's line of
railroad; and there is nothing in the complaint showing that the other inhabitants of the town of
Wagener are not as susceptible to the injurious effects of the alleged nuisance as the plaintiff.
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E. Critique ofPublic Health Torts as Regulation Through Litigation
In recent years, government lawyers have pleaded public nuisance as a
cause of action to abate social problems at the crossroads of criminal law
and the law of torts. 83 The protean nature of the tort of public nuisance
exposes state AGs to the charge that they are impermissibly blurring the
line between the legislative and judicial branches. 84 Governmental lawyers
deploying parens patriae to solve social problems are criticized for
engaging in back door regulation and not giving proper deference to the
legislative process. For example, Harvard Law School Professor John C.P.
Goldberg states that we "need to ask less, yet expect more, of tort." 8 5 He
castigates judges who follow a public interest tort paradigm for engaging in
judicial overreach because they stretch tort principles in order to advance
social justice or to "deny liability as a matter of law in the name of 'public
policy."' 86 This "new negligence," Professor Goldberg charges, provides
"judges, juries, and law professors with a mandate to undertake de novo
'social engineering.' 8 7 Goldberg doubts that courts have the competence to
devise remedies for widespread social problems, resulting in "ad hoc
solutions to perceived social ills."8 8 Donald Gifford makes a parallel
argument, that government lawyers are breaching the separation of powers
through rapacious parenspatriae actions in mass products cases.89
Part II of this article critically examines Donald Gifford's contentions
that state AGs are employing public nuisance too expansively in parens
90
patriaecases, and thereby are placing the democratic process in jeopardy.
Public nuisance was the basis for the tobacco master settlement 91 as well as
Under these circumstances, and tested by the foregoing authorities, the alleged nuisance could
only be regarded as public in its nature.").
83. See Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae,and the Attorney General
as the Guardianof the State's Natural Resources, 16 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 57, 109 (2005).
Regulation Through Litigation,
ASSOCIATION,
REFORM
84. AMERICAN TORT
http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issue=7351 (last visited Jan. 30, 2011).
85. John C.P. Goldberg, Unloved: Tort in the Modern Legal Academy, 55 VAND. L.REV.
1501, 1518 (2002).

86. Id
87. Id at 1511.
88. Id. at 1519.
89. Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature, supra note 18 (describing how the state attorney
general has emerged as a "'super plaintiff' in state parens patriae litigation" against diverse
product manufacturers including pharmaceuticals, lead paint, tobacco, and automobiles).
90. Courts have long recognized the far-reaching powers of state attorneys general in
protecting the public interest. See, e.g., Bokowsky v. State, Ill N.H. 57, 58 (1971) ("The powers
of the Attorney General are broad and numerous. Some grow out of the common law, and many
are specified by statute."); see also State Dept. of Envtl. Prot. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co.,
336 A.2d 750, 758-59 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (stating that a State may employ parens
patriaestanding for redress to injuries to natural resources as fiduciary for the states' citizens).
91. GIFFORD,supra note 17, at 120-33.
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the largest verdict ever awarded in a lead paint torts case, 92 legal actions
that Gifford attacks as judicial overreach. 9 3 Gifford contends that the
"public law model of tort litigation is the wrong tool" for solving social
problems. 94 He argues that public health torts constitute "faux-regulations,"
ill suited to address social problems. 9 5 The case studies in his book,
although raising a variety of valid concerns, suggest the opposite
conclusion.
II. PROFESSOR GIFFORD'S CRITIQUE OF THE "FOURTH BRANCH OF
GOVERNMENT"

Donald Gifford's in-depth case studies of the lead paint and tobacco
litigation shed light on the policy, doctrinal, and constitutional quandaries
that will arise in future high profile public health parenspatriae lawsuits.
Issues of justiciability, standing, separation of powers, and regulation by
litigation were raised in both of these legal struggles. Another difficulty is
that the traditional remedies for public nuisance actions by governmental
entities are abatement or enjoining a hazardous condition as opposed to
recouping monetary damages. 96 These same governance issues are likely to
arise in the Gulf Coast states' parens patriae actions against BP and other
oil industry defendants.

92. Id. at 144 (describing 2006 Rhode Island jury verdict that held the lead paint
manufacturers potentially liable for abating the consequences of lead paint rather than landlords).
93. See generally id. (describing and critiquing tobacco and lead paint litigation as a threat to
America's fundamental separation of powers because of judicial overreach).
94. Gifford, supra note 24, at 206, 222-229 (criticizing the climate change litigation
employing parens patriae as faux legislation and arguing that Congress and federal agencies are
the proper parties to regulate pollutants leading to climate change, not parens patriae
environmental lawsuits).
95. "We used to be a nation of laws, but this new strategy presents novel means of legislating
within settlement negotiations of large civil lawsuits initiated by the executive branch. This is
faux legislation, which sacrifices democracy to the discretion of . . . officials operating in
secrecy." Gifford, Impersonatingthe Legislature, supra note 18 at 915. Parenspatriaeactions by
state AGs are, in Gifford's view, "a bridge too far" in stretching tort law to address productcaused public health epidemics. GIFFORD, supra note 17, at 219.
96. For example, Ohio's General Assembly enacted "legislation to control, such litigation,
which nearly resulted in a constitutional crisis, requiring the Ohio Supreme Court to determine
whether the legislation was properly enacted into law." David J. Owsiany, The Rise and Fall of
Lead Paint Litigation in Ohio, I STATE AG TRACKER 1 (2009) (discussing how Ohio's Attorney
General voluntarily ended the litigation after a separation of powers challenge); see also Texas v.
Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 962 (E.D. Tex. 1997); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§821C, cmt a. ("The original remedies for a public nuisance were a prosecution for a criminal
offense or a suit to abate or enjoin the nuisance brought by or on behalf of the state or an
appropriate subdivision by the proper public authority.").

348

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 14:331

A. Public Law Model of Tort Litigation Endangers Democracy
Professor Gifford, as well as other critics, asserts that an unholy
alliance of greedy trial lawyers and publicity-seeking government lawyers
undermines the public interest in parens patriae actions.9 7 One legal
commentator charges that "contingency-fee lawyers have snatched the
distressed 'sleeping giant' that is the public natural resource damages
action." 98 Briefly, Gifford's thesis is that the state governments and
municipalities should not be in the business of filing public products
liability actions, but instead should turn to the legislative process. He favors
stronger statutes and concomitant regulation-not more tort law-to
resolve social problems such as childhood lead poisoning, cheap handguns,
and tobacco addiction.
In Gifford's 2011 South CarolinaLaw Review article, he draws on the
public law model of tort law in his critique of parenspatriae actions filed to
redress global climate change. 9 9 Parenspatriae for climate change may be
a bridge too far because the alleged injury is transnational and the causation
is complex. To prevail in their public-nuisance claims, the states will need
to prove that an individual company's emissions caused an injury-in-fact to
the public health.10 0 The parens patriae climate litigation, unlike the BP oil
spill parens patriae actions, creates the potential for unfair attribution of
harm because of the uncertain causal connection between injury and
indeterminate defendants:
Unlike traditional pollution cases, where discrete lines of
causation can be drawn from individual polluters to their
individual victims, climate change results only from the

97. An amicus brief on behalf of industry charges that State AGs are placed in a position of
impropriety in products-related parenspatriaeactions because they have a fiduciary obligation to
"choose which cases are meritorious and most likely to lead to a return on its investment of public
resources (measured in the broader benefit to the public good). But here, because the State's
investment in the case "is minimal, and the potential payoff is sizeable, the government will
behave opportunistically and allow contingent-fee counsel to prosecute such cases, regardless of
their merit." PCA/FSCT File Amicus Briefin Support of PetitionerBefore PennsylvaniaSupreme
Court, STATES NEWS SERVICE (Sept. 1, 2009).
98. Julie E. Steiner, The Illegality of Contingency-Fee Arrangements When Prosecuting
Public Natural Resources Damage Claims and the Need for Legislative Reform, 32 WM. & MARY
ENvT'L L. & POL'Y REV. 169, 169-170 (2007).
99. Gifford, supra note 24, at 229-232 (arguing against climate change parenspatriaeactions
as violating separation of powers).
100. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 165 (7th Cir. 1979) (noting that "[t]he
elements of a claim based on the federal common law of nuisance are simply that the defendant is
carrying on an activity that is causing an injury or a significant threat of injury to some cognizable
interest [of the states]").
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non-linear, collective impact of millions of fungible,
climatically indistinguishable, and geographically dispersed
emitters. Given this fact, granting a plaintiff relief from the
coastline-changing or other adverse consequences of global
climate change bears no genuine resemblance to identifying
a responsible defendant.10
The nexus between the BP oil defendants and harm exacted on the Gulf
Coast states' coastlines, estuaries, and economies is clear and convincing in
contrast to the climate change cases.
B. Contingency Fee Lawyers & the PublicInterest
Gulf Coast State AGs are considering entering into contingency fee
agreements with private attorneys to make use of their expertise and to
reallocate the gamble of this high-stakes litigation to trial lawyers in the BP
litigation.1 02 "Rather than costly bureaucratic regulatory schemes, litigation
by the AG's office is comparably cheaper, especially if the AG contracts
with an experienced plaintiffs' attorney under a contingency fee
arrangement." 03
Gifford finds such public/private partnerships to be inordinately
problematic. Contingency fee trial lawyers may receive multi-billion dollar
payouts, even if the parens patriae actions quickly settle, resulting in an
extortionate payout of tens of thousands of dollars per hour. 104 The
attorneys in the tobacco settlement were "paid from a $1.25 billion pool
over a four year period." 0 5
Tort reformers denounce the rise of Trial Lawyers Inc. who are said to
exercise political power without being subject to the checks and balances

101. Laurence H. Tribe et al., Too Hot for Courts to Handle: Fuel Temperatures, Global
Warming, and the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine 15 (January 2010) (Working Paper).
102. Editorial, The Pay-to-Sue Business: Write a Check, Get No-Bid Contract to Litigate for
the State, WALL ST. J., April 16, 2009, at Al4.
103. Allan Kanner, supra note 83, at 112-13.
104. "During the course of this litigation, defendants sought a ruling by the Superior Court that
the contingent fee agreement was unenforceable and void because, in defendants' view, said
agreement (1) constituted an unlawful delegation of the Attorney General's authority and (2) was
violative of public policy." State v. Lead Industries, Ass'n, Inc. 951 A.2d 428, 467 (R.I. 2008)
(discussing ethical and public policy issues in the Rhode Island state AG action against lead paint
manufacturers where law firms were to received 16.67% of the total recovery on behalf of the
state); see also generally Patrick E. Tyler, Tobacco-BustingLawyers on New Gold-Dusted Trails,
N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 1999, at Al.

105. Joy Johnson Wilson, SUMMARY OF THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL MASTER TOBACCO
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 7 (March 1999).
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that restrain government officials. 106 Financial, careerist and/or ideological
inducements may converge to incentivize state AGs to violate their
fiduciary duty to safeguard the public interest, resulting in a crisis of
legitimacy. 10 7 Cash-strapped states may be tempted to misuse the legal
system by extorting tantalizing concessions from deep-pocketed
corporations even when the legal liability is attenuated. 10 8 However, states
may enact statutes demarcating the role of trial attorneys in public torts
litigation, even prohibiting state AGs from entering into contingency fee
agreements. State attorneys general have the inherent power to veto overly
"opportunistic" trial lawyers if these private attorneys fail to fulfill the
public interest objectives of the parenspatriaeaction.10 9
Gifford deplores what he views as the devolution of public health torts
into an anti-democratic, quasi-legislative force:
In less than a decade, litigation filed against product
manufacturers by state attorneys general has changed the
structure of product regulation in the United States.
Tobacco manufacturers operate under a set of detailed
regulations governing many aspects of their operations,
including advertising directed toward young people, which
are strikingly similar to proposals previously rejected by
Congress. Federal regulators and state legislators, however,
did not devise this regulatory regime. The new regulations
resulted when state attorneys general and their partners - a
handful of plaintiffs' firms focused on mass products
liability lawsuits - brought manufacturers to the bargaining
table by filing lawsuits asserting novel substantive claims,
such as public nuisance.1 10
Champions of the public torts model counter this criticism by arguing that
private/public partnerships are a cost-effective way of remediating
106. See REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION: TRIAL LAWYERS, INC. SUPPLANTS ELECTED
OFFICIALS AND REGULATORS AS A FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT, available at
http://www.triallawyersinc.com/html/print08.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
107. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (stating that a government lawyer's goal
is to represent the sovereignty "whose obligation . . . is not that it shall win a case, but that justice
be done").
108. "You don't need a legislative majority to file a lawsuit.... The leading plaintiffs' attorney
who led the litigation efforts in New Orleans and in many other cities boasted that the plaintiffs'
bar was 'a de facto fourth branch of government."' GIFFORD, supra note 17 at 134; see also
Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature,supra note 18, at 921.
109. Julie E. Steiner, Should 'Substitute' Private Attorneys General Enforce Public
Environmental Actions? Balancing the Costs and Benefits of the Contingency Fee Environmental
Special Counsel Arrangement, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 853, 869 (2011).
110. Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature, supra note 18, at 914.
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collective health or environmental disasters. 11 1 State AGs "defend the
practice as the only way to finance these lawsuits without gambling with
millions of dollars of taxpayer money if the lawsuit is unsuccessful."I 12
Public health torts function as a gap-filler "when the normal mechanisms
supplied by the legislative branch and the administrative agencies .

..

failed

to prevent and to end these epidemics."' 13
C. Gifford's History ofPublic Health Parens Patriae Actions
Gifford's examination of parenspatriae actions in products litigation
is difficult to summarize because the legal struggles he depicts are
Byzantine litigation on steroids with as many emergent threads as a Charles
Dickens novel. His expansive description of public health parenspatriae is
invigorated by anecdotes about the historical chronicle of lead paint,
cigarettes and other products that once symbolized the "bright future of
America in the newly emerging technological era."I 14 The nationwide
distribution of consumer goods created the potential of devastating mass
harms from the widespread dissemination of dangerously defective
products.
Gifford's study of public health torts begins with a history of products
liability, describing the legal accountability of manufacturers for injuries to
consumers caused by defective products. In the late Nineteenth Century,
courts did not encounter today's thorny dilemmas involving probabilistic
injuries, indeterminate causation, or latent occupational illnesses found in
toxic torts. Torts, in this bygone era, possessed a clear causal link between
injurer and the injured. At common law, causation was a simple matter of
applying the "but for" test to a single plaintiff injured directly by an
individual defendant. 115 No convoluted chain of causation was required to
explain an injury created when a brutal conductor threw a passenger from a
moving streetcar or a railroad employee lost his leg in a decoupling
accident. 116 In contrast, the BP oil spill litigation, like lead paint and

111. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, ParensPatriaeLitigation to Redress Societal
Damages from the BP Oil Spill: The Latest Stage in the Evolution of Crimtorts, 27 UCLA J.
ENVT'L L. & POL'Y 45, 50-51 (arguing for expansion of parens patriae to redress environmental
injury to Gulf Coast States arising out of the BP oil spill).
112. Andrew Spiropoulos, State AGs Hiring Private Attorneys to Assist in Government
Lawsuits, FEDERALIST
Soc'y
(Jan.
10,
2008),
available at http://www.fedsoc.org/publications/publD.473/pub detail.asp.
113. GIFFORD, supra note 17, at 215.
114. Id. at 13.
115. Under the "but for" test, a plaintiff must prove that she would not have suffered injury
"but for" the negligence of the defendant.
116. GIFFORD, supra note 17, at 215.
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tobacco, involves latent, collective injuries that may not manifest for
decades.

1.The Failureof Torts to Address the Lead PaintEpidemic
By the early Twentieth Century, lead was ubiquitous in everyday
consumer products and as American as apple pie and the Fourth of July.
Dentists routinely used lead to fill cavities, ignorant of the hidden
hazards. 1 17 The 1893 World Columbian Exposition featured a stage for the
exposition known as "White City," named for its covering of 50,000 pounds
of white lead paint.' 18 Katharine Lee Bates' wrote her celebrated line
"Thine alabaster cities gleam" after visiting the White City stage.l19 Today,
lead paint poisoning is recognized as "a public health crisis that has plagued
and continues to plague this country, particularly its children."1 20
By the early 1900s, Australia had outlawed the use of lead in the
manufacture of paint. Gifford credits the associated fields of occupational
health and industrial hygiene for raising consciousness about the dangers of
lead paint. These occupational health professionals prefigured Rachel
Carlson's Silent Spring - where birds no longer sang because of toxic
exposures. 12 1 Despite growing consciousness of the risks of lead poisoning,
U.S. manufacturers were able to convince Congress to postpone the ban on
lead paint until 1978.122 Childhood lead poisoning from paint chips remains
decades away from eradication. 12 3 Twenty-four million housing units in the
United States still contain perilous lead paint chips.124

117. Id. at 16.
118. Id. at 13.
119. Id.

120. Rhode Island v. Lead Indus., Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 436 (R.I. 2008) (litigating parens
patriaeaction by state of Rhode Island against lead paint manufacturers).
121. GIFFORD, supranote 17, at 19, 31.
122. Id. at 30.

123. Lead paint poisoning continues to be a major problem "in communities with older houses
built when the risks of lead poisoning were unknown." Hinchey Helps Secure $2.1 Million Grant
to Help Stop Childhood Lead Poisoning in Binghamton, STATES NEWS SERVICE, (Jan. 13, 2011).
For example, in 2010, in a single N.Y. County, forty-four children were diagnosed "with elevated

levels of lead in their blood." Id Economist Rick Nevin has found empirical support for the
hypothesis that the decline in violent crime by youth in impoverished neighborhoods is partially
caused by the decline in poisoning of children by lead exposure. Shankar Vedantam,, Research
Links Lead Exposure, Criminal Behavior, WASH. POST (July 8, 2007), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/07/AR2007070701073.html.
124. "Around the nation, as estimated 250,000 kids have dangerous levels of lead in their
blood. Poisoning can lead to irreversible neurological and organ damage. It is also tied to higher
school dropout rates and violent behavior. There are still 24 million U.S. homes with exposed lead
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Courts and torts struggle with the complexities of modem injury such
as multiple causation, latent injury, the indeterminate plaintiff, and the
indeterminate defendant. 12 5 Individual plaintiffs in lead pigment cases
faced a "legal regime that made victory on their part impossible." 1 26 A
tenant apartment may have numerous coats of paint, each composed of
different combinations of lead and non-lead paint.127 Lead pigment cases
often have an additional causal connection problem in that the property
owners could have avoided the peril through proper maintenance. 12 8 in
private tort litigation, these barriers to establishing cause-in-fact give the
lead paint manufacturers a defacto immunity from responsibility.
Gifford's historical account documents a graveyard of failed avantgarde theories of tort causation that has left many Twenty-First Century
plaintiffs with rights but without meaningful remedies. To date, plaintiffs in
mass torts litigation have enjoyed little success in convincing courts to
recognize collective liability theories such as market share, enterprise
liability, civil conspiracy and concert of action. 129 While a few creative
courts have sidestepped the individual causation requirement in tort law by
recognizing market share, most courts have rejected this approach. 130
Enterprise liability is another theory of causation that has largely died out as
appellate courts have refused to expand this innovative doctrine to new
factual settings beyond blasting caps. 13 1 Plaintiffs have been thwarted in
extending market share to asbestos or other products beyond DES.1 32
Courts have nearly always refused to expand market share liability because
most mass products are not classifiable as fungibles.1 33 Similarly, many

hazards."

Meredith

Cohn, It's National Lead Poisoning Prevention Week,

BAY

AND

ENVIRONMENT (Oct. 21, 2009).

125. The traditional causation barriers were obstacles for the victims of tobacco-related
illnesses and childhood lead poisoning. GIFFORD, supra note 17, at 78. Plaintiffs allege, "that
cigarettes and lead paint cause cancer and childhood lead poisoning, respectively" and
government lawyers sought to hold multiple and indeterminate product manufacturers jointly and
severally liable. Id. at 87.
126. Id. at 33.
127. "Neither plaintiffs nor defendants possess the necessary records to determine the market
shares for lead paint or lead . . . defendant's market share because the paint containing lead
pigment are present in the three houses where the child" ingested the paint chips. Id. at 64.
128. Id at 43.
129. Id. at 62-68.
130. "Despite considerable scholarly support for the idea of market share liability the concept
met with virtually universal rejection by the courts." GIFFORD, supra note 17, at 63.
131. Id at 66 (discussing Judge Weinstein's enterprise liability theory formulated in blasting
cap case).
132. Id. at 60.
133. Id. at 64.
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appellate courts have been disinclined to recognize class certifications, thus
leaving the victims of mass torts without legal recourse. 134
The legal system's failure to embrace modem theories of cause-infact for probabilistic environmental and product-related injuries led State
AGs to join with trial lawyers in novel public/private partnerships. The state
AGs cases against lead paint manufacturers were total fiascos, even though
Providence, Rhode Island has received the unfavorable moniker, "the lead
paint capital," because of its disproportionately large number of children
with elevated blood-lead levels. 1 35 The state's Lead Hazard Mitigation Act
has failed to "increase the supply in which lead hazards have been
mitigated."' 3 6
The promise that parens patriae could redress America's lead paint
epidemic was eviscerated when the Rhode Island Supreme Court
overturned a 2006 verdict, which held lead paint manufacturers responsible
for remediating 240,000 houses and buildings in which children were
injured or endangered by flaking paint chips. 137 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court held that public nuisancel3 8 did not apply to lead paint manufacturers
because the state AG "failed to allege infringement of a 'public right'
sufficient to state a cause of action for public nuisance."l 3 9 In addition, the
court found that the state failed to demonstrate that the lead paint
manufacturers were in control of the instrumentality that caused the
injury,140 which, in this case, were the ingested paint chips.14' The Rhode

134. Id. at 70-72.
135. Rhode Island v. Lead Indus., Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 436 (R.I. 2008) ("In order to establish
clear goals for increasing the availability of housing in which lead hazards have been mitigated, to
provide performance measures by which to assess progress toward achieving the purposes of this
chapter, and to facilitate coordination among state agencies and political subdivisions with
responsibilities for housing and housing quality for lead poisoning reduction and for the
availability of insurance coverage described in this chapter, the housing resources commission
established.").
136. R.I. GEN. LAWS §42-128.1-13 (2011).
137. Owsiany, supra note 96.
138. 951 A.2d at 468.
139. Id at 447.
140. Id. at 453 ("The state's complaint alleges simply that '[d]efendants created an
environmental hazard that continues and will continue to unreasonably interfere with the health,
safety, peace, comfort or convenience of the residents of the [s]tate, thereby constituting a public
nuisance.' Absent from the state's complaint is any allegation that defendants have interfered with
a public right as that term long has been understood in the law of public nuisance. Equally
problematic is the absence of any allegation that defendants had control over the lead pigment at
the time it caused harm to children.").
141. Id. at 433 ("Unlike the Legislature's careful adherence to these long-established notions,
plaintiffs ignore the fact that the conduct that created the health crisis is the conduct of the
premises owner. Plaintiffs therefore would separate conduct and location and thus eliminate
entirely the concept of control of the nuisance.").
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Island Supreme Court ruled that the state AG action stretched the law
impermissibly and that courts:
can provide justice only to the extent that the law allows.
Law consists for the most part of enactments that the
General Assembly provides to us, whereas justice extends
farther. Justice is based on the relationship among people,
but it must be based upon the rule of law. . . . "The judge,
even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to
innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant roaming at
will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness.
He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles.
He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and
unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion
informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined
by system, and subordinated to the primordial necessity of
order in the social life." 1 4 2
The refusal of the Rhode Island Supreme Court to apply public nuisance
theory to the public health epidemic of lead paint poisoning has left tens of
thousands of children without any meaningful remedy for their permanent
mental retardation and other developmental problems.14 3
Critical race theorists view lead poisoning as racism in disguise. 14 4
The deplorable history of childhood lead paint poisoning is a reflection of
the racial and class inequities in contemporary American society.14 5
142. Id. at 436 (footnote omitted) (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921)).
143. The failure to tackle this social problem in a serious way reflects the reluctance of
legislators and courts to consider race and class differences to be of central importance. Trial
courts as "the front-line representatives and human face of the law, cannot blink away the baleful
effect in our criminal and civil litigations of sharp and growing socioeconomic differences." Jack
B. Weinstein, The Role ofJudges in a Government of by, andfor the People: Notes for the FiftyFifth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 26 (2008).
144. For a compelling study of how racial segregation correlates with unequal environmental
protections, see Rachel Godsil, Viewing the Cathedralfrom Behind the Color Line: Property
Rules, Liability Rules and Environmental Racism, 53 EMORY L.J. 1807 (2004). Tampa Bay's
inner city suffers from an epidemic of lead paint related disease. "In fact, thousands of children in
Tampa Bay (Florida) who live in old housing are exposed to the health risks associated with lead
poisoning - hearing loss, delayed or stunted speech development, behavior problems, learning
disabilities. Lead poisoning is particularly harmful to children because their nervous system and
organs are still growing." Wayne Washington, Lead, An Old Enemy, Remains a Threat, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Jan. 17, 1999, at IB.
145. Maryland ChildhoodLead Levels Decrease, U.S. STATE NEWS, July 29, 2009 (reporting
an epidemiological study of lead poisoning in Baltimore's inner city, the home of the University
of Maryland Law School, where Don Gifford teaches, that found "106,452 children under the age
of 6 years were tested, an increase over the 2007 figure of 105,708. In Baltimore City, 18,622
children were tested, an increase from 17,670 in 2007. Elevated blood lead level (EBL level): 713
children (or 0.7 percent) had an elevated blood lead level, which by law is 10 micrograms per
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Gender, too, plays a role in toxic torts cases because female-headed
households are left with the care of a disproportionate number of braindamaged infants. If more of the victims of lead paint poisoning were upper
middle class, Congress and the states would be far more likely to consign
this public health epidemic to the dustbin of history. Professor Gifford
denounces the Rhode Island parens patriae actions, but the state AG's
lawsuit was the last line of defense against an epidemic of childhood lead
poisoning. In parens patriae public health actions, government lawyers
serve on the front lines because of the benign neglect of legislators and
regulators.
2. The Legacy of the Tobacco Master Settlement
Each year more than 400,000 Americans die of smoking-related
injuries, a death toll greater than the rate of "homicides, vehicle crashes,
alcohol, suicides and fire." 1 46 Gifford provides a compelling history of
tobacco use beginning in 1604 when England's King James I warned that
smoking tobacco was "loathsome to the eye, hatefull to the nose, harmeful
to the braine, dangerous to the lungs."l 4 7 Tobacco was a leading industry in
the American colony of Virginia. By the end of the Nineteenth Century,
tobacco smoking was entrenched in American culture as millions took up
the habit. 14 8 Technological advances, such as the introduction of white
burley tobacco and flue curing, created blends that were milder and thus
easier to inhale. 14 9 James Bonsack, the Henry Ford of tobacco, reduced the
cost of smoking by creating an assembly line that "could produce over two
hundred cigarettes a minute."l 50
Public health officials warned of the skyrocketing incidence of lung
cancer as early as the first half of the Twentieth Century. 15 1 Between 1914

deciliter or above. This is lower than the 0.8 percent in 2007. In Baltimore City, the EBL was 2.5
percent, which is down from 3.5 percent in 2007."). In contrast to the current epidemic of
American children suffering retardation from lead paint, Canada has all but eradicated the
problem. "The number of Canadians with potentially dangerous levels of lead in their blood has
dropped from 25 per cent in 1978 - the last time lead was measured nationally - to less than I per
cent." David Bruser, Canadians'LeadLevels Drop Sharply; But StatisticsCanadaStudy Failed to
Measure Metal Quantities in Most Vulnerable Group Kids Under 6, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 25,

2008, at A25.
146. Joe Newman, Tobacco Company Health Claims Should be
http://www.citizen.org/prezview/articles.cfm?ID=19112 (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).

Regulated,

147. GIFFORD, supra note 17, at 20.

148. Id.
149. Id. at 15.
150. Id
151. See id. at 21 (discussing "a lung cancer epidemic in twentieth-century America" and a
paper published in 1939 by researcher Franz Hermann MUller about the relationship between
cigarette smoking and lung cancer).
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and 1950, lung cancer rates increased twenty fold, as approximately half of
all American adults became cigarette smokers. 152 The tobacco industry
mounted a massive disinformation campaign to create a swirl of uncertainty
over the validity of empirical evidence of disease being produced by
epidemiologists.1 53 For many decades, the tobacco industry was successful
"in puncturing the scientific consensus . . . that cigarette smoking caused

lung cancer."' 54 Cigarette companies promoted filtered and sweetened
brands to undermine the public's perception that smoking was dangerous.
The World of Tomorrow exhibit at the 1939 World's Fair in New
York linked tobacco with a bright American future by featuring "Electro the
Moto-Man," a seven-foot tall robot, who smoked cigarettes while
welcoming visitors. 15 5 The tobacco industry hoodwinked even medical
professionals through their astute public relations campaigns. Magazine
advertisements featured endorsements by physicians touting the health
benefits of smoking. Doctors stood in long lines to receive complimentary
cigarettes from Philip Morris at the 1947 American Medical Association
Convention.156 As late as 1994, R.J. Reynolds's CEO compared the
addictive attributes of cigarettes to "those of coffee, chocolate, and
Twinkies."1 57 For much of the Twentieth Century, tobacco defendants
enjoyed, in effect, a tort-free zone to market their deadly products.
Plaintiffs in tobacco products liability cases generally pleaded causes
of action such as negligence or the implied warranty of merchantability
without success.1 58 The tobacco lawyers countered with "blaming the
victim defenses," such as contributory negligence and the assumption of
risk; 159 themes that resonate with the individualism at the core of American
culture. 160 The tobacco defense lawyers asserted that, "[t]he plaintiffs
contributory negligence or assumption of risk totally barred the plaintiff
from recovery, even if the defendant's conduct was more egregious or

152. See id. (noting that in the United States, the number of lung cancer cases went from 371 in
1914 to 7,121 in 1950).
153. Id at 22.
154. Id. at 23.
155. Id at 13.
156. Id
157. Id. at 24.
158. Id. at 36; see also Richard A. Daynard & Mark Gottlieb, Keys to Litigating Against
Tobacco Companies, 35 TRIAL 18 (1999) (reporting tobacco's perfect record of winning every
case including two appellate cases reversing plaintiff's jury verdicts).
159. GlFFORD, supra note 17, at 36.
160. "Perhaps the most successful defense offered by the cigarette manufacturers involved
variations on the assumption of risk doctrine - the argument that smokers chose to smoke despite
awareness of potential adverse health effects, and therefore were legally responsible for their own
illnesses." Steven K. Berenson, Government Lawyer as Cause Lawyer: A Study of Three High
Profile Government Lawsuits, 86 DENv. U. L. REV. 457, 462 (2009).
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substantial in causing the plaintiffs injury."'61 Juries were predisposed to
agree with the tobacco industry's arguments that smokers made a personal
choice to run well-known risks of cancer and other diseases.1 62
In a successful effort to sidestep these "victim-blaming" defenses,
Mississippi filed a parens patriae public health lawsuit in 1994 to recover
the medical costs of treating that state's victims of tobacco-related
disease.163 Parens patriae litigation avoided previously intractable issues
such as foreseeability, causal indeterminacy, and negligence-based
defenses. The states could not be tarred with user-oriented defenses
because they had never smoked a single cigarette.1 64 Mike Moore,
Mississippi's AG, conceptualized the lawsuit to recoup the states' direct
costs caused by smoking: "You caused the health crisis, you pay for it. The
free ride is over. It's time these billionaire tobacco companies start paying
what they rightfully owe to Mississippi taxpayers." 1 65 Attorney General
Moore described the action as "the most important public health litigation
ever in history."1 66
Forty-six states eventually joined Mississippi by asserting their quasisovereign authority "to sue as a collective plaintiff on behalf of its citizens
suffering from product-related diseases." 1 6 7 The state AGs jettisoned strict
liability, negligence and warranty in favor of the torts of "public nuisance,
unjust enrichment, and indemnity."1 6 8 Under public nuisance theory,
defenses such as assumption of risk and contributory negligence melted
away because the state was the plaintiff rather than smokers and their
estates. 169
161. GIFFORD,supra note 17, at 39.
162. Id at 40.
163. Tobacco Settlement Review: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 105th
Congress, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (July 16, 1997) ("Attorney General Mike Moore of

Mississippi filed the first lawsuit by a state government against the major cigarette manufacturers
on May 23rd, 1994. In that action, General Moore sought injunctive relief to protect Mississippi's
children from the marketing practices of the tobacco industry and sought restitution for hundreds
of millions of dollars spent by Mississippi taxpayers occasioned by the provision of health care to
indigent citizens and to those other citizens who qualify for medical assistance under various
programs.").
164. David Barstow, Can This Man Tame Tobacco? ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), April 7,
1997, at IA. ("After all, no state ever chose to smoke a single cigarette. Yet the state foots the bill,
through Medicaid payments, for thousands of smokers too poor to pay for their own medical
care.").
165. CARRICK MOLLENKAMP ET. AL., THE PEOPLE VS. BIG TOBACCO: HOW THE STATES
(Bloomberg Press,
1998), available at
THE
CIGARETTE
GIANTS
TOOK ON
http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/m/mollenkamp-tobacco.html.
166. Id. at1.
167. GIFFORD, supra note 17, at 64 ("Parenspatriae litigation thus accomplishes what the
victim herself could not have accomplished as a litigant.").

168. Id.at 122.
169. Id at64.

2011]

REFORMING PUBLIC INTEREST TORT LAW

359

Faced with these parens patriaeactions, the tobacco industry acceded
to a master settlementl 70 with the five largest tobacco manufacturers
(Brown & Williamson Tobacco corporation, Lorillard Tobacco Company,
Philip Morris Incorporated, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company,
Commonwealth Tobacco, and Liggett & Myers).171
This settlement was controversial because it was a clear example of
"regulation through litigation."' 72 The state AGs were primarily seeking
indemnification for Medicaid expenses, but, as part of the settlement, they
demanded changes in the way that the tobacco industry marketed and
advertised cigarettes in order to lower the rate of smoking by minors. The
state AGs formulated an "alternative regulatory system through judicial
action, bankrupting the companies, or imposing sufficiently severe penalties
for tobacco company practices, particularly the practices of advertising to
young people" and for artificially jacking up the nicotine level in order to
create millions of American cigarette addicts. 17 3 For instance, "tobacco
manufacturers were prohibited from opposing state legislation that ban[ned]
the manufacture and sale of cigarette packs containing fewer than 20
cigarettes" after November 23, 1998.174 The tobacco settlement outlawed
"cartoon characters in advertising," and restricted brand-name sponsorship
of events with significant youth audiences and banned outdoor advertising
as well as free samples.' 7 5
Gifford argues that the provisions protecting children from tobacco
addiction were inevitable so there was no need for the state AGs to demand
these reforms. 176 He approvingly quotes tobacco industry advocates who
argue that regulators were already micromanaging "cigarette labeling and

170. Joy Johnson Wilson, SUMMARY OF THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL MASTER TOBACCO

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 5 (March 1999) ("The agreement settle[d] all antitrust, consumer
protection, common law, negligence, statutory, common law and equitable claims for monetary,
restitutionary, equitable and injunctive relief.") The settlement gave the states over $206 billion
beginning in June, 2000.
171. Id at 4.

172. See Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, State Farm v. Avery: State Court Regulation
Through Litigation Has Gone Too Far, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1215, 1215-16 (2001) ("Lawyers and
activist courts discovered the power of high-stakes litigation to force an entire industry to change
its commercial behavior during the well-publicized state attorneys' general tobacco litigation in
the late 1990s. Since then, other lawful industries such as automobile manufacturers, health
insurance companies, firearms manufacturers, and computer companies have been targets of this
policy-driven litigation.").
173. Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature, supra note 18, at 922 (discussing the motives of
the Mississippi Attorney General and the other forty-five state attorneys general who joined the
Master Settlement).
174. Wilson, supra note 170, at 3.
175. Wilson, supra note 170, at 6.
176. GIFFORD, supra note 17, at 108, 173.
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advertising issues."77 This argument is disingenuous given that the
regulators had not yet addressed the marketing of smoking to children, the
use of Joe Camel as the advertising mascot for Camel Cigarettes, the easy
availability of vending machines to minors and other important reforms
required by the tobacco settlement. 178
The public law model of torts developed in large part because of
Congress' refusal to regulate tobacco or lead paint, coupled with the failure
of individual litigants to prevail in products liability. Only after it became
apparent that Congress and state legislatures lacked the political will to
regulate these products, did the victims of tobacco-related illnesses and
lead chip poisoning turn to the tort system. 179 Regulatory torts mobilize
private claimants "to identify and deal with problems that have not been
adequately addressed by other institutions."I180
Big Tobacco provides an emblematic example of regulatory failure at
every level. The industry's vast political influence and financial resources
stymied Congress' attempt to regulate the marketing of tobacco products.181
Congressional Committee chairs from tobacco states did their best to "delay
many federal anti-tobacco legislative proposals."1 8 2 It is true that "during
the same year that Mississippi filed the first state litigation against the
tobacco companies, the FDA initiated the process to begin the
comprehensive regulation of cigarettes." 1 83 However, this effort was
stillborn because of the tobacco industry's successes in federal appellate
courts located in tobacco country. The lower court in Greensboro, North
Carolina upheld the FDA's regulations but the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, based in Richmond, Virginia, reversed this decision.18 4 The U.S.
177.

Id.

178. Id. at 105 (noting that public health and antismoking activists were critical of regulatory
efforts including FTC labeling and packaging rules).
179. "Thus, the failure of conventional forms of legislative and administrative regulation of
tobacco products and the recent shift in the landscape of tobacco litigation indicate that tobacco
product liability litigation provides one of the most promising means of controlling the sale and
use of tobacco." Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the
Effective Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 63, 63-64 (1997)

(arguing that tobacco products enjoyed a limited immunity for many decades because of
administrative and legislative failure to enact effective tobacco control legislation).
180. Richard Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law, 54 U.CHI. L. REv. 184, 198 (1987).
181. Bruce Yandle, et. al., Bootleggers, Baptists, & Televangelists: Regulating Tobacco by

Litigation, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1225, 1246-47. (2008) ("During this time [the 1950s and 1960s],
the tobacco industry needed no allies to achieve its objectives for several reasons. First, the
industry could directly protect itself from emerging threats because its power to block change at
the federal level was pervasive. Members from tobacco-producing states chaired one-third of
House committees and nearly one-quarter of Senate committees in the early 1960s.").
182. GIFFORD,supra note 17, at I 1- 12.
183. Id. at 118.
184. Id. at 110.
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Supreme Court upheld the Fourth Circuit, ruling that the Federal Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) had no jurisdiction to regulate tobacco.1 85
Every time Big Tobacco got in any kind of trouble with regulatory
agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission or the Federal
Communications Commission, their lobbyists went to Congress to bail
them out. 186 "The tobacco industry's influence over federal and state
legislators makes it difficult, if not impossible, for effective tobacco control
legislation to be passed at the federal or state level." 1 87 Gifford criticizes a
Public Citizen Report that concluded: "The fact that tobacco money buys
pro-tobacco results is clear, consistent, and irrefutable." 1 88 He cites an
empirical study suggesting that the tobacco industry's campaign
contributions of millions of dollars to every session of Congress were "a
less important factor in voting patterns than were the legislators' generally
pro-business and anti-regulatory philosophies." 89
Public health regulation of tobacco was impractical because of the
Supreme Court's holding in FDA v. Brown & Williamsonl90 that Congress
had not granted the Federal Food and Drug Administration jurisdiction to
regulate tobacco products:'91
In FDA v. Brown & Williamson, the Supreme Court
blocked the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) from
exerting regulatory authority over the tobacco industry, and
in the process restricted the amount of deference provided
to public health authorities. In that case, the Court
developed new rules for statutory interpretation that gave
future courts greater flexibility to strike down public health
regulations in non-tobacco settings. In particular, the Court
collapsed the two-part Chevron test into one step by using
the statute's "context" to conclude that the statute in
question did not contain any ambiguity. By addressing the
185. Id. at 4.
186. Yandle et al., supra note 181, at 1243 n.63 ("The FTC and FCC actions in the 1960s and
1970s, for example, along with the three waves of suits against the tobacco industry from the
1950s forward, caused the industry to perpetually fend off attack with the main weapons they had:
Congress, big law firms, and secrecy. Each of these weapons showed holes and grew less
powerful with time, as regulation-by-litigation came to the fore."). In the 1990s, the tobacco
industry was able to beat back the FDA's efforts to regulate tobacco. Id. at 1254 ("After this
episode [attempt to regulate tar content], cigarettes mostly avoided additional federal regulatory
oversight until the 1990s, when the FDA attempted to assert regulatory authority. A significant
reason was the tobacco industry's continued sway in Congress, particularly in the Senate.").
187. GIFFORD, supra note 17, at 69-70.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 111.

190. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
191. Id. at 142-43.
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issue this way, the Court was able to circumvent Chevron's
far more deferential second step. Although the Supreme
Court's decision was likely driven by the cultural and
economic importance of tobacco, this legal mechanism
developed in Brown & Williamson was later used to strike
down public health regulations in other fields. 192
Tobacco is not the only industry that has enjoyed a tort-free zone.
Gifford's case study of the lead paint pigmentation cases filed in Rhode
Island illustrates the failure of public nuisance and parens patriae to
remediate a serious social problem affecting hundreds of thousands of
children. Prominent plaintiffs' attorneys, inspired by their successes in the
tobacco settlement, approached Rhode Island government officials to seek
recovery from the manufacturers of lead pigment. The Rhode Island
Attorney General joined forces with plaintiffs' attorneys to adapt public
nuisance theories to address the public health epidemic of childhood lead
poisoning. While the AG tobacco lawsuits resulted in a master settlement,
the Rhode Island paint litigation was stillborn. The lead paint industry has
far less culpability than Big Tobacco as they did not conceal the hazard or
engage in a systematic conspiracy to market their products to children. In
fact, the lead pigment industry sponsored neutral scientific studies of lead
exposure, in sharp contrast to the tobacco industry's comprehensive
campaign of misinformation.
D. Reassessing Regulation Through Litigation
In our mass tort cases, delayed decision and frustration of
rights is endemic. Powerful stories of human tragedy have
echoed in my court through the years: women damaged by
their mothers' ingestion of DES, who are now unable to
have children of their own; Vietnam veterans, frightened of
the effects of herbicides on their progeny; men struck down
by dreaded lung cancers because, when they were still
teenagers, they were exposed to asbestos while building the
ships with which we won a war; persons suffering from
AIDS because of tainted blood used in transfusions; and
mothers driven to become drug couriers by cruel traffickers
and poverty. To see those who live such stories is to
understand why the law must be sensitive to human
needs. 193

192. Micah L. Berman, Smoking Out the Impact of Tobacco-Related Decisions on Public
Health Law, 75 BROOKL. L. REv., 1, 15-16 (2009).
193. Weinstein, supra note 143, at 26.
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Donald Gifford places his confidence in the legislative process and
federal and state administrative agencies rather than the courtroom.194 He
maintains that tort law is not the proper legal institution to force industries
to change their marketing practices or pursue mitigation efforts because
such reforms are properly the exclusive province of legislatures and
administrative agencies. In Gifford's opinion, it is irresponsible for the
states to resort to parens patriae litigation as an alternative to regulation.1 9 5
He concedes that, "[c]hildhood lead poisoning is a public health problem,
even if it is not a public nuisance." 1 96 By the time that the Rhode Island AG
filed a lawsuit against the pigment manufacturers, paint containing lead
pigment was no longer on the market because, in 1978, Congress enacted9a7
nationwide ban on the marketing of paint containing lead pigment.1
Nevertheless, 38 million housing units containing lead-based paint are still
not remediated, creating a continuing public health epidemic among
children of the urban underclass. 198
Gifford concludes his book with a stinging critique of public health
parens patriae in products cases, contending that the "tobacco and lead
pigment litigation cycles not only largely failed to accomplish their public
health objectives," but also upset the "constitutional allocation of
powers."' 9 9 Gifford states, "Congress, state legislatures, and federal and
state administrative agencies can and must do better to prevent tobaccorelated illnesses and childhood lead poisoning." 2 00 In his opinion, it is
possible that the political processes failed . . . because [the legislative

branch] did not represent the will of the electorate" 2 0 1
We do not share Gifford's faith in the legislative and regulatory
process when powerful industries such as Big Tobacco make a determined
effort to capture the regulators, the courts, and the politicians. Parens
patriae actions have a continuing vitality in redressing the harms suffered
by the Gulf States in the recent BP oil spill. Phoebe Haddon criticizes
Gifford for leaving the states with no alternative in dealing with collective
injuries:
Gifford reminds us that James A. Henderson earlier
observed that it is commonly accepted 'in a representative
democracy macro-economic regulation is accomplished by

194.
195.
196.
197.

GIFFORD, supra note 17, at 228.
Id. at 112.
Id at 227.
Id. at 112.

198. Id
199. Id at 218.
200. Id. at 228.
201. Id
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elected officials and their lawful delegates.' But the fact is
that neither state nor federal legislatures seem inclined to
address these problems in a broad way, responsive to the
needs of numerous individual tort victims or the public
interest in addressing massive and expensive health effects
of products. Indeed, as Gifford confirms, state legislative
agendas have been dominated by business interests bent on
limiting, not expanding, tort claims and relief, through caps
to pain and suffering, limitations on actions and immunity.
Congress has gutted the grounds for class actions and is
more likely to limit or eliminate claims rather than expand
liability; it seems more bent on conflating victim rights
with frivolous suits. 202
III. IN DEFENSE OF THE PUBLIC LAW TORT MODEL
"An adequate tort law remains crucial to providing "for" the people.
Tort law is our primary fallback method of empowering ordinary people to
remedy injustices to themselves through their courts." 20 3 Over the
centuries, the law of torts evolved to solve public health hazards of each
historic epoch. 204 The public policy underlying tort law in the prenegligence period, 1200 to 1825, was to protect community and the public
order, not just address "private wrongs." 20 5 Tort law enables plaintiffs to
obtain civil recourse but torts also involve the interests of the larger public,
which Leon Green described as the interests of "we the people." 2 06 "What
is important to note here is that torts often redress public wrongs, beyond
the interests of the immediate parties." 2 07 The public health parens patriae
action is the latest example of what Leon Green called "public law in
disguise." 20 8

2010,
12,
April
BLOG,
TORTSPROF
Review,
Book
Haddon,
202. Phoebe
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/tortsprof/2010/04/guest-blogger-phoebe-haddon-update-onthe-umd-clinic-and-thoughts-on-don-giffords-new-book.html.
203. Weinstein, supra note 143, at 20, 43 (2008).
204. The emblematic feature of the parens patriae public health actions for the deleterious
effects of cigarettes and lead paint held "multiple and indeterminate product manufacturers jointly
and severally liable" for public health problems. GIFFORD, supra note 17, at 87.
205. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 59, at 9-10.
206. See Leon Green, Should the Manufacturer of General Products Be Liable Without

Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REv. 928, 937 (1957) ("Whatever the doctrine, strict or less strict, it has
its source in the maximum protection that can be given through the courts to 'we the people,' and
at the same time not burden enterprise beyond its capacity to function.").
207. Michael L. Rustad, Torts as Public Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REv. 433, 440 (2011).
208. Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1 (1959).
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The common law of torts is continually evolving, as it is "not a closed
system of static rules, immutable unless changed by legislation." 2 09 As
Judge Jack Weinstein reminds us, "[c]ontroversies about how the courts
should exercise their powers in interpreting the Constitution are not new.
Jefferson's battle with Marshall over the limits on the Court's power still
reverberates." 2 10 The courts' role in eliminating segregation, for example,
created a firestorm that lasted for decades. 2 11 The courts took over school
districts at a time when many American educational institutions had
apartheid-like enrollment policies. This controversial expansion of judicial
power is now overwhelmingly regarded as admirable.
The critics of public health torts ask courts to step aside in favor of
legislatures and regulators and to wait for decades while hundreds of
thousands of additional children ingest paint chips or become addicted to
cigarettes. Justice Benjamin Cardozo was one of the first to recognize that
tort law did not come from the legal heavens nor was it "deduced from an
orderly conceptual system of precepts." 2 12 Parenspatriae public nuisance
litigation is a flexible remedy that can be invoked when public authorities
fail to shield the citizenry from an avoidable epidemic of injury.
A. Rejoinder to Giford's Critique of the Public Law Model of Torts
Donald Gifford's anthem would likely be "Public Health Torts! What
Are They Good For?" Moreover, the answer he gives in his latest book is
"Absolutely nothing!" "Public Health Torts, huh, yeah. What are they good
for? Absolutely nothing." If Edwin Starr were to write an anti-torts anthem,
he might say:
Public Health Torts, it ain't nothing but a heartbreaker
Public Health Torts, it's got one friend
209. Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., Principles, Persuasions, and Primrose Propaganda, 19 NAT'L
ASS'N CLAIMANTS' COMPENSATION Arr'Ys L. J. 25, 25 (1957).
210. Weinstein, supra note 143, at 20 (defending the public law model of tort law and
comparing it to constitutional litigation).
211. Judge Weinstein worries that much of the court's desegregation work will be stopped in
its tracks because of a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision involving Seattle and Jefferson County.
Id at 243. Judge Weinstein quotes Justice Breyer to support this point. Id. at 242-43 ("The very
school districts that once spurned integration now strive for it. The long history of their efforts
reveals the complexities and difficulties they face . . . . They have asked us not to take from their
hands the instruments they have used to rid their schools of racial segregation, instruments . . .
they believe are needed to overcome the problems of cities divided by race and poverty . . .. This
is a decision . . .the Court and the Nation will come to regret."). Weinstein writes that the Court
"refused to recognize that these local school boards were using racial classifications to help, rather
than, as in pre-Brown to denigrate Blacks." Id at 243. Gifford's reform proposal is for courts to
reject the use of parens patriae lawsuits to redress an epidemic of lead paint poisoning, tobacco
addiction, and other social problems affecting children's health and welfare.
212. Dan Simon, The Double-ConsciousnessofJudging: The Problematic Legacy of Cardozo,
79 OR. L. REV. 1033, 1043 (2000).
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That's the undertaker. 2 13
Our former teacher, 2 14 the late Abram Chayes, first conceptualized the
"public law model," observing that the "dominating characteristic of
modern federal litigation is that lawsuits do not arise out of disputes
between private parties about private rights. Instead, the object of litigation
is the vindication of constitutional or statutory policies." 2 15 Parenspatriae
tort actions addressed environmental and public health problems where
neither Congress nor the state legislatures had provided sufficient
leadership. 2 16
The partnership between state AGs and trial lawyers in suing the
tobacco companies, lead pigment industry, and now the BP oil defendants is
the latest stage of tort law as public health prescription. 2 17 These parens
patriaetort actions, filed by government lawyers, address environmental or
public health problems where Congress or the state legislatures failed. 2 18
Public health parens patriaelawsuits are the last defense against corporate
wrongdoers who fail in their duty to safeguard the public interest.
The environmental parens patriae actions by Louisiana and other Gulf
governments will serve quasi-criminal law objectives of punishment and
deterrence if the oil industry defendants are found to have recklessly carried
out deep-water oil drilling operations or if there is proof of the companies'
conscious indifference to the safety of their workers. Ex post public health
213. Edwin Starr, Lyrics to War, http://www.oldielyrics.com/lyrics/edwin_starr/war.html (last
visited Feb. 19, 2010).
214. Michael Rustad studied international legal process with Professor Chayes in the Harvard
University Law School's LL.M program. Tom Koenig studied with Professor Chayes at Harvard
Law School during his Liberal Arts Fellowship in Law and Sociology a decade later.
215. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1284-85 (1976) ("[Tihe dominating characteristic of modern federal litigation is that lawsuits do
not arise out of disputes between private parties about private rights. Instead, the object of
litigation is the vindication of constitutional or statutory policies."). Chayes noted that Nineteenth
Century adjudication "assumed that the major social and economic arrangements would result
from the activities of autonomous individuals." Id. at 1285.
216. See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 24 at 202 (discussing the timing of climate change
litigation). Gifford notes that "[tihe use of common law tort actions to implement regulatory
regimes when the political branches had stalemated reached unprecedented heights when states,
municipalities, and class action representatives filed tort actions seeking to impose more stringent
emission standards on those who emit greenhouse gases contributing to global climate change."
Id. at 216-17.
217. Gifford critiques this new evolutionary stage of parens patriae for product-related
epidemics. He characterizes State AG products actions as "driven by mass plaintiffs' attorneys
who often profit handsomely, to the tune of thousands of dollars per hour." Professor Urges
Legislative Solutions, Not Court Battles, to Public Health Dangers, HT MEDIA LIMITED (April 17,
2010).

218. The tobacco litigation was filed in the wake of Congress' refusal to regulate big tobacco.
"A decade later, frustrated by a stalemated Congress's inability to address global climate change,
environmentalists, state attorneys general and mass plaintiffs' attorneys are again turning to the
courts, this time to regulate greenhouse gas emissions." Gifford, supra note 24, at 202.
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and environmental parenspatriae actions bridge the gap left by inadequate
ex ante regulation at the state and federal level. 2 19 Public products liability
and environmental litigation need to address catastrophic oil releases as
well as other public health and environmental disasters that are not
adequately dealt with by legislatures, regulators or prosecutors.
B. Safeguardingthe PublicInterestfrom OverreachingAGs
1. Standing to File Parens Patriae Public Health Cases
In Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez,2 20 the
U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a line of cases employing public nuisance in
parens patriae actions.221 The Court characterized parens patriae as an
instrumentality enabling states to file lawsuits on behalf of their citizenry to
advance a "quasi-sovereign interest," which is a "judicial construct that
does not lend itself to a simple or exact definition. "222 Whenever a state
asserts standing to sue in aparenspatriaecase, it must: (1) "allege injury to
a sufficiently substantial segment of its population;" (2) "articulate an
interest apart from the interests of particular private parties, i.e., the State
must be more than a nominal party;" and (3) "express a quasi-sovereign
interest." 2 23 These elements are also the predicates for a contemporary
public health parens patriae action. Public health tort lawsuits should be
initiated only when there is a grave risk to health and safety not addressed
by legislators, regulators, or the private tort system. Parenspatriae lawsuits
supplement but should not supplant either regulation or private tort
litigation.

219. "The parens patriae is a flexible collective claims mechanism that enables states to bring
suits to "safeguard[] nearly all the interests that a state might reasonably seek to protect." Richard
P. leyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco Litigation, and the
Doctrine of ParensPatriae,74TUL. L. REV. 1859, 1882 (2000).
220. Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. P.R., 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982) (defining the states' quasisovereign interest as protecting their citizens from discrimination).
221. The Snapp Court reviewed a line of U.S. Supreme Court cases decided during the first
two decades of the Twentieth Century where states deployed public nuisance tort actions against
other states for discharging sewage and other toxins that polluted interstate waters and endangered
the health of their citizenry. Id. at 603 (citing North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923);
Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921);
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907);
Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901)); see also,
Maine v. Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097, 1099 (D. Me. 1973) ("Suits by a State, parens patriae,have
long been recognized.")
222. Snapp, 458 U.S. 592 at 600; Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 258 (1972)
(noting that a state may "sue as parens patriae to prevent or repair harm to its quasi-sovereign
interests").
223. Snapp, 458 U.S. 592 at 607.
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2. Parens Patriae & Judicial Overreach
Gifford argues that parens patriae actions are anti-democratic and
violate principles of separation of powers. 224 The danger in letting trial
lawyers and government attorneys pursue "regulation by litigation" is that
there is no formal mechanism for democratic participation. For example, in
the tobacco litigation, state AGs and trial lawyers developed a regulatory
framework without approval of Congress or expert agencies. 2 25
Gifford indicts parens patriae public health torts as an example of
extreme judicial overreach, but the states have always wielded their "'police
power' to protect the health of their citizens, as well as the parens patriae
power to protect disadvantaged citizens." 2 26 Lead paint and tobacco parens
patriae actions were in accord with the historical use of this doctrine to
promote the "best interests of minors, and an interest in promoting the
public health of minors." 227 Parenspatriae authority permits a state, in
delimited circumstances, to exert its governmental "interest in [protecting]
the health and well-being-both physical and economic-of its residents in
general." 22 8 "The state retains extensive regulatory power even over
families-that is, parens patriae power-so that 'a state is not without
constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when
their physical or mental health is jeopardized."' 2 29 The lead paint cases
were about protecting vulnerable children living in urban housing projects
and the tobacco cases were about preventing children from becoming
addicted. Public nuisance draws from the spring of equity and fills the void
left by inadequate tort or regulatory remedies.
3. Separation ofPowers & Federalism Concerns
Gifford asserts that the Master Tobacco Settlement's detailed and
extensive regulation of tobacco products conflicts with Congress'
224. Professor Gifford tacitly assumes that because the legislature has acted in a given area,
that public tort actions are precluded by the "separation of powers." GIFFORD, supra note 17, at
205. He acknowledges that state statutes authorize attorneys general to file parens patriaeactions.
Nevertheless, he contends that "[s]eparation of powers principles calls for the diffusion of power
among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government." Id. He applies federal
separation of powers principles by analogy to the states. Id. at 206. However, states are not
"miniature versions of the national government." G. Allan Tarr, Interpretingthe Separation of
Powers in State Constitutions, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 329, 330 (2003).
225. Gifford, Impersonatingthe Legislature, supra note 18, at 914.
226. Joan H. Krause, Healthcare Fraud and Quality of Care: A Patient-CenteredApproach,
37 J. HEALTH L. 161 (2004).

227. Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101, 1127 (10th Cir. 2006) (Herrera, J.,
dissenting).
228. Snapp, 458 U.S. 592 at 607.
229. C.P. Dominic Ayotte, Troxel v. Granville: Parental Power to Determine Associational
Interests of Children, 52 BAYLOR L. REv. 997, 1005 (2000).
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representative powers. 230 He views the state AGs' actions in the tobacco
settlement as the legitimate domain of the legislative branch rather than the
judicial branch. This is an odd argument because state attorneys general are
not even part of the executive branch of the federal government. 23 1 State
attorneys general are part of the executive branch of state governments. The
separation of powers is about conflicts between coordinate branches of the
federal government, not about state AGs displacing Congress' authority to
regulate the labeling and marking of tobacco products. 2 32
The BP parens patriae actions do not raise substantial issues of
federalism. It has been long established that states may employ theirparens
patriae powers to protect their citizens' health. The predicate for a public
health parens patriae action is that the state AG identify a substantial
segment of its population affected by a hazard such as chemical
dispersants. 23 3 In the BP oil spill, there is obviously sufficient quasisovereign interest to justify state actions. 234 Numerous U.S. Supreme Court
decisions have upheld the right of states to employ parenspatriaeto enjoin
public nuisances that constitute public health threats. 23 5
4. ConstitutionalConcerns with the GulfStates' PublicHealth Lawsuits
The Gulf Coast AGs are not encroaching upon powers of Congress,
the U.S. Supreme Court, or the Executive Branch in pursuing public
nuisance claims against the BP oil industry defendants. Unlike the Master
Tobacco Settlement, in the BP parenspatriaeactions, courts have not been
asked to "micromanage" regulations governing chemical dispersants or
other aspects of the cleanup that Congress regulates. The federal courts
simply have no principled reason to refuse to adjudicate these claims.
Separation of powers issues arise when a coordinate branch of the
federal government exceeds its specific powers enumerated in the

230. GIFFORD, supra note 17, at 205.
231. Id. (arguing that the conflict is not between the judicial branch and the legislative branch
but between the state AG's role as a member of the executive branch infringing on the
prerogatives of the representative branch).

232. Id.
233. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. P.R., 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
234. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 258 (1972) (stating that a state may
"sue as parenspatriae to prevent or repair harm to its 'quasi-sovereign' interests").
235. See, e.g., New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921) (upholding parenspatriaeaction
against other state to abate the discharge of sewage); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S.
230 (1907) (upholding Georgia's parens patriae lawsuit to enjoin copper smelter causing air
pollution endangering its citizens' health and welfare); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901)
(upholding state's parenspatriae action to abate air pollution).
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Constitution. 2 36 This is clearly not the case here. Louisiana and other Gulf
Coast states that may join the public health litigation are pursuing state tort
causes of actions under well-established equitable powers of parens
patriae.
5. Gulf Coast States' Standing in PublicHealth Litigation
In the BP parens patriae actions, federal courts have standing and
there is no compelling reason why they should refrain from adjudicating
these claims, since they are dealing with a local public health problem.
States, rather than Congress, historically have exercised the primary
responsibility for protecting the health and welfare of their citizens. 23 7
Similarly, there is no issue of political question or of Article III standing
since the Gulf Coast States are employing state tort law to protect their
citizenry. Unlike the climate change parens patriae, courts are not being
called upon to decide abstract questions involving the indeterminate
causation of environmental degradation. 23 8 Here, the causal connection
between the BP oil spill and the public health menace is clear and
convincing. There is no doubt that the defendants have caused an
environment disaster affecting substantial numbers of citizens in the Gulf
Coast States.
C. The Future ofPublic Health Parens Patriae Partnerships
Forecasting the future of the public health parenspatriae is hazardous.
It is too soon to determine whether the millions of gallons of oil and toxic
chemicals will cause significant long-term health problems. The Gulf
States will have standing to file parenspatriae lawsuits if a public health
crisis materializes because states have a quasi-sovereign interest in
protecting the health and welfare of all their citizens. 239 The essence of
these public health tort lawsuits is offering interstitial protection to society
where private tort litigation and regulators fail. Parens patriae is an

236. Krause, supra note 224, at 163. "The federal government's authority to regulate public
health is derived, on the other hand, from specific powers enumerated in the Constitution, such as
the powers to tax, spend, and regulate interstate commerce." Id. at 183 n. 147.
237. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (stating that courts should exercise selfrestraint in not adjudicating claims more appropriately addressed "in the representative
branches").
238. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (stating that the standing doctrine does not
permit court to decide "abstract questions of wide public significance" where other governmental
institutions are "more competent to address the questions").
239. 72 AM. JUR. 2D STATES, ETC. § 90 (2011) ("The 'parenspatriae' doctrine is a recognition
of the principle that a state, when a party to a suit involving a matter of sovereign interest or
quasi-sovereign interest, must be deemed to represent all its citizens, and therefore has
standing.").
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essential equitably based means to overcome the extreme difficulties of
single plaintiffs taking on billion dollar industries such as tobacco and paint
manufacturers.
Donald Gifford is correct in warning that parenspatriae lawsuits are
subject to abuse, especially in so-called private/public partnerships in
which state AGs cede too much control of the litigation to trial lawyers. 2 4 0
The borderline between private and public justice blurs if state AGs breach
their fiduciary duty to the public for the prospect of a career-enhancing
settlement. However, the judiciary has ample tools to deal with this danger.
Judges have the inherent power to reject parens patriae settlements that
shortchange the public interest. Just as courts may refuse to approve class
action settlements, they have the authority to reject parens patriae
settlements that give trial attorneys grossly disproportionate fees. Courts
must supervise parens patriae to ensure that a careful balance is struck
between employing the talents, skills, experience of private trial lawyers
and ensuring that societal interests are advanced.
States are uniquely situated to determine whether public/private
partnerships fit their budgetary and other needs. 2 4 1 Louisiana's AG
contended, for example, that his state's sovereignty would be
"compromised if there are not separate tracks, because the states would
inevitably be required to defer to private parties' attorneys as liaison or lead
counsel."2 4 2 Recently, Alabama's Attorney General, Luther Strange,
assumed "personal control of the state's" BP claims. 24 3 In contrast, his

240. See generally, GIFFORD, supra note 17, at 211 (describing hiring of plaintiffs' firms by
states and cities in tobacco and lead paint public health litigation and resultant ethical issues).
Contingency fee agreements between government lawyers and trial attorneys have the potential to
create troubling ethical and practical dilemmas. Government lawyers owe a higher fiduciary duty

to the public than do trial attorneys. The danger is that when trial lawyers pursue zealous
advocacy, the public interest may be sacrificed. The Rhode Island Supreme Court, which
ultimately did not disapprove of contingency fee agreements, noted in the leading lead paint
parens patriae case that there was a potential conflict between the ethical standards of trial
lawyers and government lawyers. State v. Lead Industries, Ass'n, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 473 (R.I.

2008) ("Although all attorneys have numerous important duties and responsibilities by virtue of
their role as members of the bar, attorneys general have additional special duties, which, because
of the nature of that ancient and powerful governmental office, differ from those of the usual

advocate. Unlike other attorneys who are engaged in the practice of law, the Attorney General
"has a common law duty to represent the public interest.").
241. For example, when George W. Bush was Governor of Texas, he signed a bill that limited

the authority of Texas' attorney general to retain private lawyers to aid in class action lawsuits.
242. Rebecca Mowbray, State Fights Proposal to Lump its BP Oil Spill Litigation Together
With Other Suits, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 6, 2010 (quoting Louisiana Attorney General),
available at

http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/10/state fights_proposal tolump.html.
243. Luther Strange, Alabama in Forefront of BP Claims Litigation, GADSDEN TIMES
(Alabama), April 24, 2011.
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predecessor, Troy King, cooperated with trial lawyers244 in developing
Alabama's parens patriae complaint against BP and other oil industry
defendants. 245
Mississippi's AG, who was then considering filing BP-related
lawsuits, disagreed with King, favoring a Chinese Wall between private and
public actions against the BP oil spill defendants. 24 6 In contrast, the City of
Pensacola, Florida is assembling a "dream team" 24 7 of private lawyers to
assist it in pursuing their BP oil spill-related claims for "reduction in
revenue because of the oil spill." 2 4 8 In the forty-three states that elect their
attorney general, 24 9 the voters may remove AGs who fail to fulfill their
fiduciary duty to protect the public interest. Legislatures in the Gulf States
could adopt sliding scales limiting the contingency fees collected by trial
attorneys or require that the legal fees be proportionate to reasonable hours
expended. Finally, legislatures could enact statutes prohibiting contingency
fee agreements entirely.
CONCLUSION: THE U.S. STILL NEEDS PARENSPATRIAE PUBLIC HEALTH
LAWSUITS

State AGs have the right, as well as the duty, to exercise their parens
patriaeand police powers to protect children from the perils of lead paint,

244. Troy King, who lost his bid for reelection as Alabama's AG, cooperated with trial lawyers
and considered entering into a contingency fee agreement to pursue that state's BP-related oil
spill claims. State AG King clashed with Alabama governor Bob Riley who opposed King's plans
to cooperate with prominent trial lawyers. He contended that the Alabama "attorney general
offered private law firms a contingency fee of 14 percent of the state's total claim to join the case."
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Ala. Governor Limits Attorneys Fees in Oil Spill Lawsuit (Aug. 17, 2010),

http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1 202469951114.
245. The state attorney general filed one public environmental tort complaint against British
Petroleum (BP) and its corporate affiliates connected to the oil spill. See Complaint, supra note 1.
The same day, the Alabama Attorney General filed a virtually identical complaint against non-BP
companies such as Transocean Ltd., the provider of drilling management services, designer of the
oil rig, and Halliburton Energy Services, who completed the cementing operations. See BP
Complaint, supra note 2.
246. Mississippi Attorney General in No Hurry to Sue BP Over Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 17, 2010),
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tobacco and toxic spills.2 50 In the lead paint and tobacco litigation, parens
patriae functioned to express grievances for mass product injuries where
regulation was either lax or nonexistent. Prior to the Master Tobacco
Settlement, the catastrophic costs of tobacco-related illnesses fell solely on
the smokers, their families, health care providers and the taxpayer. The
story of lead paint illustrates the promise of parens patriae but this
equitable remedy was ultimately dashed by the Rhode Island Supreme
Court. The continuing vitality of parenspatriaelawsuits is evidenced in the
Gulf Coast AGs' actions to redress significant public health problems
created by the oil spill.
The Gulf Coast States' actions against BP and other oil industry
defendants raise many challenging issues for tort law, constitutional law,
and public policy. Donald Gifford's new book does a fine job of laying out
the limitations and the potential for abuse of this remedy, but his lack of
realistic solutions will leave many victims of public health epidemics
without a meaningful remedy. The public law model of tort law emphasizes
the judicial system's role in addressing larger societal interests "outside and
beyond the interests of the immediate parties to the litigation." 2 5 ' A flexible
public tort regime is necessary to reallocate the public health costs from the
citizenry to the wrongdoer. Since the Thirteenth Century, the government
has had not only a right, but also a duty to protect the vulnerable. 25 2 In the
Twenty-First Century, this equitable remedy has evolved to enable
government lawyers to address public health catastrophes as a gap-filling
mechanism.
We are living in a historical epoch where injury is collective and may
not manifest for many decades. The long-term public health effects of the
BP oil spill, for example, are currently unknown and unknowable. Donald
Gifford's narrow view of parenspatriaereflects a Nineteenth Century view
of accidents that limits tort law to cases that have a clear causal connection
to the resultant injuries. In the modem globalized era, injuries will
increasingly take the form of public health catastrophes where the injuries
may be latent and probabilistic. The public health parens patriae is the
latest stage in the evolution of tort law in responding to emergent social
problems in cases of ineffective legislative and regulatory responses.

250. We disagree with Gifford that judicial restraint doctrines such as standing and the political
question doctrine should stymie the Gulf Coast states actions against BP and the other oil industry
defendants to address the long-term health effects of the oil spill.
251. Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise,38 TEX. L. REv. 1, 2 (1959).
252. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN

ENGLAND AND AMERICA 521 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 13th ed. 1886).

